On 16/12/13 14:31, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
<snip>
That does not excuse
1) Failing to examine the issue when the DFN root accounted for half of
the purported '600 CAs'
2) Continuing to count the DFN as 300 CAs when they know it is one.
Putting out sloppy research and then failing to correct it when a
mistake is committed is the problem. If someone publishes a flawed study
I expect them to withdraw it when the errors are pointed out. I don't
expect them to say that they are going to continue to publish a number
they know is out by a factor of at least 2 because getting a correct
number would be too much work.
FWIW, I suggested to Mozilla a few months ago that they could survey the
CAs in order to find out the correct number (or, at least, a rather more
accurate approximation!)
They seemed interested.
The conversation was somewhere in the middle of this thread...
http://mozilla.6506.n7.nabble.com/SSL-TLS-and-HTTPS-in-a-Post-Prism-Era-td294842.html
--
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online
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