Good catch wrt the EUI. I missed that. S.
On 19/04/16 18:12, Alissa Cooper wrote: > Alissa Cooper has entered the following ballot position for > draft-ietf-tictoc-ptp-mib-08: No Objection > > When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all > email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this > introductory paragraph, however.) > > > Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html > for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. > > > The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tictoc-ptp-mib/ > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > COMMENT: > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > (1) The ClockIdentity is described as being generated based on an EUI-64 > address as described in IEEE 1588-2008 Section 7.5.2.2.2. But in IEEE > 1588-2008, there are two different ways the clock identifier can be > generated, the other being a non-EUI-64 address defined in 7.5.2.2.3. Why > is that option left out of the ClockIdentity description? > > In general I was dismayed to see the re-use of EUI-64 for clock identity > for the security and privacy drawbacks, since it's not particularly clear > that re-using those identifiers is necessary here. But if such a fix is > warranted this MIB is not the place to do it in any event. > > (2) Looking at > https://trac.tools.ietf.org/area/ops/trac/wiki/mib-security I recall that > other MIB documents we've reviewed recently have listed out the specific > tables/objects that may be considered vulnerable or sensitive, even if > those objects are read-only. Why doesn't this document do that? I would > think all of the clock identity objects would belong in that bucket at a > minimum. > >
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