Mark et al

You said *TW wasn't built from the ground-up for mult-user, and it's 
definitely not how most people are using it. I'm sure products built as 
server-side entities (e.g. WikiMedia) have all sorts of protection against 
injected code. *

I agree, yet we have Bob which makes this plausible at least where people 
who access the wiki are trusted such as in a team. Perhaps not secure on 
the internet where anyone can get to it. 

   - I think this may be a self fulfilling prophesy, we don't have secure 
   methods to share online or run in a multi-user mode, so no one does.
   - Because we don't have multi-user solutions on the internet people come 
   to expect all the control they want on their own local wikis, I don't want 
   the security tail wagging the dog, if I want to iframe sites I use, or use 
   it to drag and drop patches between wikis, I would not like this being 
   locked down.
   - Despite me calling for this mulit-user functionality, see Check in and 
   out critical to the use of tiddlywiki #5919 
   <https://github.com/Jermolene/TiddlyWiki5/discussions/5919> with the 
   simplest form serial editing using a check out and in facility I can't seem 
   to get any traction on this.

Given the discussion in this thread, perhaps we need a way to harden 
tiddlywiki for the internet, but I hope we don't harden it for the sole or 
LAN users or teams. It seems we may need to "bifurcate" to the risky and 
less risky environments, another possibility is being able to run a 
vulnerability check on a wiki.

The best security will give us our cake and we can eat it too, the wrong 
security will mean we can't eat the cake, or look at it in the security of 
our own room.

In closing of great importance are the many possible ways tiddlywiki can be 
made use of, but we need to maintain flexibility even when attempting to 
secure it the the "great unwashed internet", because it often has little or 
nothing to do with the internet. 

Regards
Tones



On Wednesday, 18 August 2021 at 13:33:11 UTC+10 Mark S. wrote:

> TW wasn't built from the ground-up for mult-user, and it's definitely not 
> how most people are using it. I'm sure products built as server-side 
> entities (e.g. WikiMedia) have all sorts of protection against injected 
> code. 
>
> Anyone who can write and  save a tiddler can make a javascript tiddler, or 
> a widget, or overwrite a javascript filte operator, or maybe header 
> scripts, or maybe in-frame code. I guess you would have to think of all the 
> ways that code could be injected and then neutralize everything that 
> matched. But you'd have to do it before the tiddlers got written to the 
> common pool, and you'd have to either block legitimate uses of the iframe, 
> or figure out some way to detect that the frame doesn't contain js source 
> code.
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, August 17, 2021 at 7:06:05 PM UTC-7 joshua....@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>
>> I am currently playing with "real-time multiplayer" capabilities for TW5, 
>> so this is an interesting security vulnerability to be aware of.
>>
>> My primary concern was "what if a malicious user connected a 
>> MIS-IDENTIFIED wiki to a real-time server. It has a bunch of malicious 
>> tiddlers, and it DOES NOT have a bunch of tiddlers that exist in the server 
>> copy."
>>
>> The real-time sync, once authenticated and authorized, would just 
>> absoloutely wreck the server-copy of the wiki in this instance.
>>
>> Similarly, being able to some-how sync malicious javascript code, hidden 
>> in a data-uri to the server, which will sync it to all connected users is a 
>> concern...
>>
>> Best,
>> Joshua Fontany
>>
>> On Tuesday, August 17, 2021 at 10:12:13 AM UTC-7 TiddlyTweeter wrote:
>>
>>>  Mark S. wrote:
>>>
>>>> That was one of the concerns with TWederation. You could import from 
>>>> someone you trusted who imported from someone they trusted who ... 
>>>> actually 
>>>> couldn't be trusted. It's kind of a hard problem.
>>>>
>>>
>>> *Right! *It IS an interesting issue. But *maybe as much an 
>>> anthropological issue as a technical one. *
>>> Suddenly tech switches into *"HOW CAN I TRUST?" *mode. 
>>> Despite the fact most everyone, well everyone, here (you, reading this) 
>>> is completely trust-worthy. 
>>> I think its a basic sociological fact that much of the internet is NOW 
>>> premised on the idea you can't trust anyone.
>>> It has led to a kind of "authentication gymnastics" that makes doing 
>>> some things very convoluted.
>>>
>>> Just rambles
>>> TT
>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Tuesday, August 17, 2021 at 8:13:42 AM UTC-7 saq.i...@gmail.com 
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> I'd be more concerned about people being tricked into importing a 
>>>>>> tiddler that contained code like this.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> From my perspective this is the only practical concern, and once again 
>>>>> emphasizes the need to be careful when importing content from others. 
>>>>>
>>>>

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