-----Original Message-----
From: David Epstein [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Monday, December 11, 2006 4:00 PM
To: Teaching in the Psychological Sciences (TIPS)
Subject: [tips] Re: Fwd: Great books of science (top 25 anyway)
(The listserver will see to it that this is my last post of the day!)
Sounds like a good idea for me, too.
So Skinner is rejecting model A in favor of model B:
(A) external events --> thoughts and feelings --> observable behaviors
(B) external events --> internal behaviors (thoughts and feelings)
\-> observable behaviors
As I understand Skinner, he wrote in favor of (A) (e.g., Science and Human
Behavior, 1953, pp. 23-42). In several place, he seemed to speak of the
organism as a mediator, as a locus where variables come together. In Beyond
Freedom and Dignity, Skinner (1971) says the following in characterizing the
"autonomous man" argument. I think it is not too dangerous to argue that he
accepts the idea that people _are_ mediators.
"The function of the inner man is to provide an explanation which will not
be explained in turn. Explanation stops with him. He is not a mediator
between past history and current behavior, he is a _center_ from which
behavior emanates.... (p. 14).
On Mon, 11 Dec 2006, Bryan Midgley went:
> To say that thoughts/feelings are irrelevant is too extreme, as has
> already been pointed out by Paul. Irrelevant to what? To
> understanding the human condition? To controlling behavior? They
> are links in the chain (Skinner, 1953) and therefore relevant.
When you say thoughts/feelings "are links in the chain," do you mean
they *do* mediate relationships between contingencies and behavior?
If that's what Skinner said in 1953, he turned around and explicitly
disavowed it in _Beyond Freedom and Dignity_.
It's possible that Skinner changed over time, but it seems likely to me that
his arguments appear different because he was sometimes addressing different
issues, making different points, etc.
> But to control behavior, we go back to the environment, as I _think_
> every psychologist must.
But if cognition is a "link in the chain"--a mediator--doesn't it
follow that behavior should also be changeable through, say, cognitive
restructuring? Any practicing clinician would probably want to know
that such an option is available.
Skinner might have asked what you mean by "cognitive restructuring." This
is a rough attempt at an interpretation but is this a therapist teaching a
client to behave -- or even think -- differently in particular situations?
As has been mentioned, Skinner had no problem with private events. And I
see no "autonomous man," here. A therapist, as an environmental agent, is
trying to change the behavior, some of it perhaps private, of a client.
> for every successful environmental intervention, for every behavior
> that is successfully controlled via contingencies, without
> consideration of the inner agents, that's evidence that they need
> not be the focus (as in "autonomous man").
There's a tremendous difference between "they need not be the focus"
(a reasonable and empirically supported position) and "they should not
be the focus because they have no effect on behavior" (an
extraordinary claim).
Perhaps. But "have no effect on behavior" might be more an interpretation
of Skinner. At this point, for any who care, going directly to the source
might be useful instead of relying on paraphrases that might only be
confusing matters.
-Bryan Midgley
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