Re Esther Strahan's request for information about contemporary psychodynamic theory: The articles by Morris Eagle referenced below provide detailed examinations of the contemporary psychodynamic theory commended by Drew Westen (1998).
In her somewhat sceptical comments Esther quotes Westen (1998) claiming that "psychology has independently come around to some of the basic propositions of contemporary psychodynamic theory and has done so in an empirically sound way..." Let's consider that together with other of Westen's comments on contemporary psychoanalysis. Westen describes (p. 334) object relations theory as "the major development in psychodynamic theory over the past 30 years". Morris Eagle has closely examined object relations theory, and here are his conclusions: "The clinical data generated by an object relations theory or self-psychology approach are as epistemologically contaminated as data generated by the more traditional approach... [T]he etiological claims made in more current formulations are even more logically and empirically flawed than Freuds etiological formulations" (1983, pp. 49-50). And more generally on contemporary psychodynamic theory, including object relations theory, Eagle writes: "I believe that after examining the different variants of so-called contemporary psychoanalytic theory... one must conclude that the theoretical formulations and claims that constitute contemporary psychoanalytic theory are on no firmer epistemological ground than the central formulations and claims of Freudian theory" (1993, p, 404). (Note that Eagle comes from within the psychoanalytic tradition. Currently Emeritus Professor of Psychology at Adelphi University, and faculty member NYU Postdoctoral Program and Psychoanalytic Institute at NYU Medical Center, he was past president of the Division of Psychoanalysis of the APA.) With reference to the first two "most prominent contemporary psychoanalytic theorists" cited by Westen in the above passage (p. 334), Malcolm Macmillan observes that "no facts can be adduced to allow a choice between Kohut and the traditional Freudians or between either of them and Kernberg" (1997, p. 588). As Esther notes, Westen asks the reader to set aside critiques of Freud himself, since it's not fair to criticize a guy who died in 1939. Westen acknowledges that many aspects of Freudian theory are out of date, and writes that this is hardly surprising since Freud died in 1939. What this omits is that every major aspect of Freudian theory was cogently criticised *around the time it was formulated or shortly afterwards*, but such critiques were either ignored or glossed over by Freud and his supporters. Freudian theory has not simply been criticised in hindsight in the light of modern developments, as Westen seems to imply. A follow up to Chris Green's pointing out that, contrary to Westen's contention, "the 'centrality' of unconscious processes in modern cognitive psychology derives not from Sigmund Freud, but from the earlier work of Hermann Helmholtz and Wilhelm Wundt": I note that Westen (p. 335) recycles Freud's story that it was only "poets and philosophers" who held that much of mental life is unconscious before he wrote on the subject, whereas, as Altschule (1977, p. 199) has pointed out, this view was commonplace among psychologists in the late nineteenth century. On this same subject Westen (p. 334) gives as the first, and most central, proposition to which all psychodynamic theorists generally adhere that "much of mental life... is unconscious." A little later (p. 335) he acknowledges that "Freud was not the first to notice unconscious processes: poets and philosophers beat him to it. He was, however, the first to build a systematic psychological theory on this proposition, which was attacked vociferously by psychologists of nearly every persuasion for almost a century." What is obscured by this way of presenting the facts is that the Freudian extensions of the widely-held notion of unconscious mental processes were, for the most part, *deservedly* criticised by psychologists in the twentieth century. References: Altschule, M. D. (1977). *Origins of Concepts in Human Behavior: Social and Cultural Factors*. Wiley. Eagle, M. N. (1983). "The epistemological status of recent developments in psychoanalytic theory." In R.S. Cohen and L. Lauden (eds.), *Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis* (Reidel, 1883), pp. 31-55. Eagle, M. N. (1993). "The Dynamics of Theory Change in Psychoanalysis." In J. Earman et al (eds), *Philosophical Problems of the Internal and External Worlds: Essays on the Philosophy of Adolf Grunbaum* (Univ. of Pittsburg Press, 1993), pp. 373-408. Macmillan, M. (1997). *Freud Evaluated: The Completed Arc*. MIT Press. Westen, D. (1998). "The Scientific Legacy of Sigmund Freud: Toward a Psychodynamically Informed Psychological Science." Psychological Bulletin, 124 (3), 1998, pp. 333-371. Allen Esterson Former lecturer, Science Department Southwark College, London http://www.esterson.org/ ----------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2007 15:03:53 -0500 Author: Esther Yoder Strahan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: looking for a good critique of modern psychodynamic approaches > > Dear Tipsters, > > I seek your collective wisdom. On the advice of a friend wishing to > enlighten me, I recently read Drew Westen's (1998) Psych Bull article > entitled "The scientific legacy of Sigmund Freud: Toward a > psychodynamically informed psychological science." He asks the reader to > set aside critiques of Freud himself, since it's not fair to criticize a > guy who died in 1939. Instead, he enjoins the reader to examine > contemporary psychodynamic theory, and in the article he seeks to present > evidence of its utility for modern psychology. He argues that there are > basic propositions which were initially Freudian and have now become > mainstream, including things like the centrality of unconscious processes. > He states that either we are "all Freudians now... [or]...one could equally > contend that psychology has independently come around to some of the basic > propositions of contemporary psychodynamic theory and has done so in an > empirically sound way so that contemporary psychodynamic thought remains > superfluous" (which latter fallacy he seeks to refute). > > There are a number of things that bother me about his comments. Unless I'm > missing something, Westen's logic seems somewhat tortured--e.g. in his view > Pennebaker's work on journalling is supportive of basic psychodynamic > concepts, as is the entire social cognitive literature on priming effects, > cognitive neuroscience's findings on parallel distributed processing, etc.. > To me this seems analogous to crediting Leonardo da Vinci with all > achievements in modern aviation. > > So, I am looking to TIPSTERS for suggestions on good recent critiques of > contemporary psychodynamic theory, about which I know very little. I would > be grateful if any of you out there who have more depth and breadth in this > area and could suggest readings. > > Thanks!! > > Esther > ***************************************** > Esther Yoder Strahan, Ph.D > Chair, Department of Psychology > Heidelberg College > 310 East Market Street > Tiffin, Ohio 44883-2462, U.S.A. > Tel. 419-448-2238 > Fax 419-448-2236 > ****************************************** Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2007 15:26:31 -0500 Author: "Christopher D. Green" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Re: looking for a good critique of modern psychodynamic approaches > > Esther Yoder Strahan wrote: > > > I seek your collective wisdom. On the advice of a friend wishing to > > enlighten me, I recently read Drew Westen's (1998) Psych Bull article > > entitled "The scientific legacy of Sigmund Freud: Toward a > > psychodynamically informed psychological science." He asks the reader > > to set aside critiques of Freud himself, since it's not fair to > > criticize a guy who died in 1939. Instead, he enjoins the reader to > > examine contemporary psychodynamic theory, and in the article he seeks > > to present evidence of its utility for modern psychology. He argues > > that there are basic propositions which were initially Freudian and > > have now become mainstream, including things like the centrality of > > unconscious processes. > > The "centrality" of unconscious processes in modern cognitive psychology > derives not from Sigmund Freud, but from the earlier work of Hermann > Helmholtz and Wilhelm Wundt, both of whom hypothesized "uncounscious > inferences" back when Freud was a but a boy. The revival of the > unconscious cognitive in the 1960s and '70s came about not as a result > of the acceptance of Freudian theory by scientific research > psychologists (indeed, by that time even the many psychiatrists had > fallen off the wagon) but, rather primarily a result of the urge to > re-introduce cognitive processes into psychology without rehashing the > fruitless arguments about consciousness that had given rise to > behaviorism in the first place. Helmholtz and Wundt provided the perfect > precedent. > > Regards, > -- > > Christopher D. Green > Department of Psychology > York University > Toronto, ON M3J 1P3 > Canada --- To make changes to your subscription go to: http://acsun.frostburg.edu/cgi-bin/lyris.pl?enter=tips&text_mode=0&lang=english
