Jeffrey Nagelbush wrote:
>I believe that science, whatever else it is, is a way (or ways) to
>understand the natural world.... My problem with these alternative
>approaches [to knowing] is their claim to [be] an alternate way
>of SCIENCE.... Their ways may be useful and even important, but
>they are not science.
I agree with these statements. But they also beg an important question:
what is science? That is, how do we go about distinguishing a scientific
theory from a nonscientific (especially a pseudoscientific) one? On the
same day that I read the above, I read a book review by John Dupré (a
philosopher of science) entitled, "The fight for reason and science."
Dupré (2000) noted two things about scientists: (a) they act as if they
believe that the defining characteristics of science are obvious (one
immediately knows science when one sees it); and (b) they generally seem
to believe that science is an either/or proposition (i.e., a given
theory either is scientific or it is not). Dupré argued, on the other
hand, that science is not easily defined and that it exists on a
continuum in which some theories are more scientific than others:
"Just as potential examples of obscenity range from the indisputable
(sexualized violence against children) to the questionable (Anaïs Nin's
erotica) to items that are clearly outside the domain (_Sesame Street_),
so potential examples of science fall along a similar spectrum--say,
from molecular genetics to evolutionary psychology to tarot reading."
(p. 43)
In order to clarify what makes a theory scientific, he listed several
"epistemic virtues" (without claiming that these are exhaustive) that a
theory should show before it can be called "scientific":
(1) it has the ability to explain relevant facts;
(2) it has the ability to generate predictions that are confirmed;
(3) it is consistent with other related knowledge.
Any given theory will satisfy these (or any other) criteria only to a
degree, and some theories will score higher on these criteria than
others: some theories will explain more relevant facts, will generate
more confirmable predictions, and will be more consistent with related
knowledge than other theories. Furthermore, there is an arbitrary
cut-off point separating scientific from unscientific theories. This
shows that the adjective "scientific" exhibits "vagueness," a
philosophical concept that refers to 'a predicate that lacks sharp
boundaries'. In a second article I read the other day, the philosopher
Fred Ablondi (1999/2000) gave several examples of vague predicates
(e.g., "when does the successive removal of grains of salt make a heap
of salt a nonheap?") and noted that vagueness leads to the "sorites
paradox." An example of this paradox:
"1. A person with £5,000,000,000 is rich.
"2. Someone does not go from being rich to being not rich by losing £1.
"3. Therefore, someone with £4,999,999,999 is rich.
"By repeated applications of 2, we get:
"4. Therefore, someone with £6 is rich." (p. 20)
The sorites paradox also results when we examine the vague predicate of
"scientific." For example, with respect to the three criteria of science
listed above, it is impossible to state precisely the point at which a
theory goes from being scientific to unscientific. How many relevant
facts must a theory explain, how many confirmable predictions must it
generate, and how consistent must it be with related knowledge before we
can call a theory scientific? The vagueness of the term "scientific"
makes it possible for proponents of a theory to argue that it represents
good science even when critics try to deny it this status.
Perhaps a way out of this morass is to develop criteria of
"pseudoscience." Hines (1988) attempted to do this. According to him
(and the authors he cited), a pseudoscientific theory is one that has
the following characteristics (a scientific theory would have the
opposite characteristics; e.g., see Stanovich, 1998):
(1) it generates unfalsifiable predictions;
(2) its predictions are not tested with controlled research situations;
(3) its general principles and concepts are not changed when evidence
contradicts them.
These criteria of pseudoscience focus on the issue of making and testing
predictions (the second criterion of "science" from above). Although
they sound reasonable, the predicate of "pseudoscientific" is as vague
as that of "scientific." In fact, Hines admitted as much in the third
sentence of his introductory chapter: "In the real world things are not
clearly delineated but surrounded by gray areas that doom any hard
definition" (p. 1). It would be possible, I think, to point to theories
generally accepted as scientific that score relatively high on the
pseudoscience criteria (the notion of "biological preparedness" comes
quickly to my mind) and other theories generally accepted as
pseudoscientific that score in the same range as the higher-scoring
scientific ones (perhaps theories of acupuncture, for example).
What I am suggesting is that, if we are to remove pseudoscience from
psychology, we must describe better what makes a theory scientific
(according to Dupré, "Imre Lakatos once remarked that scientists
typically understand science about as well as fish understand
hydrodynamics," p. 43). As teachers of the science of psychology, we
must develop ways of thinking about and describing good science for our
students so that they (and we ourselves) will be able to distinguish
highly scientific from moderately scientific from marginally scientific
from nonscientific claims, instead of dividing all theories into those
that are scientific and those that are "something else." If we can place
theories on a "continuum of science" based on a rough estimate of how
they score on several criteria, we might help our students to better
understand what we mean by calling something "scientific." We should
teach our students that not everything that is labeled "scientific" is
an exemplar of science; and that some nominally scientific theories
should not be considered to be so. But, in order to do this, we must
become much more sophisticated philosophically than I suspect most of us
are.
I definitely am including myself in this group of philosophically
unsophisticated instructors (although I realize that "philosophically
unsophisticated"also is a vague predicate).
Jeff
References:
Ablondi, F. (Winter 1999/2000). Vagueness: An introduction (sort of).
_Philosophy Now_, Issue 25, 20-21.
Dupre, J. (March/April, 2000). The fight for reason and science. _The
Sciences_, _40_ (No. 2), pp. 40-45.
Hines, T. (1988). _Pseudoscience and the paranormal: A critical
examination of the evidence_. Amherst, NY: Prometheus.
Stanovich, K. E. (1998). _How to think straight about psychology_ (5th
ed.). New York: Longman.
--
Jeffry P. Ricker, Ph.D. Office Phone: (480) 423-6213
9000 E. Chaparral Rd. FAX Number: (480) 423-6298
Psychology Department [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Scottsdale Community College
Scottsdale, AZ 85256-2626
"The truth is rare and never simple."
Oscar Wilde
"Science must begin with myths and with the criticism of myths"
Karl Popper
"If you want to learn new things, you should try reading old books."
Richard Cytowic
