The related threads of the last few days have been inspirational to me
(even if my own ignorance about essential philosophical issues causes me
to struggle intensely to try to develop cogent points). It is becoming
clearer to me that we react very strongly to one particular aspect of
psychological pseudoscience: its metaphysical (ontological) assumptions.
Although we may talk feverishly about methodological flaws in
pseudoscientific research (e.g., the lack of adequate controls), what
seems to raise our hackles most are attempts to (re)introduce into
psychology a Cartesian mind-body dualism. The concepts of energy fields,
psi, and transcendent states of consciousness all seem to carry these
dualistic assumptions (regardless of the protests of some of their
supporters). If these ideas were accepted within our discipline as
mainstream (or even marginal) science, many of us believe this would be
the death knell of psychology as a (natural) science. And we would be
correct, I think.
A large part of the reason for this concern with dualism involves what
we have been discussing over the last several days. Scientific
psychologists, as a group, are materialists who study mental
events--phenomena that traditionally in our culture have not been
conceived as having a material existence. In order to study these
phenomena scientifically, we have had to make the claim that they
represent natural phenomena based in physical processes in the body.
Nevertheless, in developing our theories, we tend to use a mentalistic
language that we have inherited from our culture. This practice has
allowed psychology to be readily accepted (and widely respected) by the
broader culture, but at the cost of encouraging serious
misunderstandings about the nature of psychology as a science. In
particular, it has created a situation in which any mentalistic
language, regardless of its metaphysical assumptions, is believed by
many in the wider culture to represent psychology.
Let me give a couple examples of what I mean. When I say that I have an
"irrational belief" about myself, I am using a mental category
("belief") that is derived from everyday language. I use the term in
order to explain my actions and predict how I will act in future
situations. I believe that my irrational belief is most directly caused
by activity in my nervous system (i.e., that it is identical in some
unknown way to this activity). I also believe that it doesn't
necessarily make sense to reduce it to that activity: I am using the
term as a higher-order construct in a system of statements designed to
help me predict and explain my behavior (thank you Jerry Fodor and Paul
Smith). The wider public, however, probably doesn't understand this use
of the term "belief." To them it is a term that represents something
that exists in a dualistically conceived "mind." This is not a problem
as long as we are using the term to explain and predict behavior in the
situations being discussed: we can gloss over the differing assumptions
as long as we stay focused on practical matters (such as trying to
change the belief).
It becomes a problem, however, when the use of everyday mental
categories allows us to slide into the use of other kinds of mentalistic
language with more obligatory dualistic assumptions. For example, I
might claim that I have a "disturbance in my 7th chakra" (or whatever it
is that people say about chakras). In this case, I also am trying to
explain a particular set of actions and (perhaps) predict future
actions. To many in the wider culture (and apparently to some within
psychology itself), this claim seems similar to the statement about
irrational beliefs. But it definitely contains different ontological
assumptions. If they see this language as being no different from the
earlier talk about "beliefs," then we begin to have problems with their
conception of psychology. If there are psychologists who also use this
language in their theorizing, then we have problems with the foundations
of our discipline.
In order to prevent the particular dualistic approaches now infiltrating
psychology from gaining an even stronger foothold than they have,
perhaps we do not need so much to distinguish science from pseudoscience
as we need to promote the philosophical doctrine of naturalism as a
CENTRAL aspect of our discipline. And, when one promotes naturalism, one
does NOT divide the world (including human nature) into natural and
supernatural components and then study only the former. Instead, one
assumes that EVERYTHING can be understood as resulting from natural
processes, including the human mind and behavior. As I have said in
other posts, this is a very radical conception of human nature and one
that is not palatable in the wider culture, or even among many
psychologists.
I think I must sound like a broken record. This is not intentional. It
just seems that, over the last year or two, I keep taking different
routes around the same issues; and regardless of the route I take, I
keep coming to the same conclusions. Nevertheless, I feel that, by
listening to your criticisms and comments about these ideas, I
constantly am refining (very slowly perhaps) what were initially crude
points.
Jeff
--
Jeffry P. Ricker, Ph.D. Office Phone: (480) 423-6213
9000 E. Chaparral Rd. FAX Number: (480) 423-6298
Psychology Department [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Scottsdale Community College
Scottsdale, AZ 85256-2626
"The truth is rare and never simple."
Oscar Wilde
"Science must begin with myths and with the criticism of myths"
Karl Popper
"If you want to learn new things, you should try reading old books."
Richard Cytowic
