> On Tue, Jul 28, 2015 at 6:28 PM David Benjamin <david...@google.com> wrote: > > > Are you intending that this mechanism be enabled by default for HTTP/2 or > > would the prohibition against renego still apply? Without any way for the > > client to tie the CertificateRequest to the HTTP request that triggered it, > > this mechanism would have many of the same problems as renego as far as > > HTTP/2 is concerned. (I realize Microsoft has a draft floating around for a > > TLS_RENEG_PERMITTED HTTP/2 setting. The setting can control this too I > > suppose.)
Even if there would be way to tie it to request that triggered the request, it would still IMO have some of the nastiest problems of renegotiation, especially in context of HTTP/2 in web (the privilege involved is almost impossible to handle in any sane way). What I think would be very useful: A way for client to signal it has a client certificate it expects to use, regardless of if valid configuration is known. The vast majority of times client certificate is used, the client knows about that before initiating a connection. IMO, the proper way to handle "this resource requires client certificate" is for server to signal that in application protocol and then client to establish a new connection with client certificate (or if application protocol supports it, do the authentication at application layer without ever involving TLS, except for channel binding). -Ilari _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
