Hi On 16/03/2016 15:02, "TLS on behalf of Watson Ladd" <[email protected] on behalf of [email protected]> wrote:
>On Wed, Mar 16, 2016 at 5:36 AM, Peter Gutmann ><[email protected]> wrote: >> After a number of, uh, gentle reminders from people who have been >>waiting for >> this, I've finally got around to posting the TLS-LTS draft I mentioned >>a while >> back. It's now available as: >> >> http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-gutmann-tls-lts-00.txt >> >> Abstract: >> >> This document specifies a profile of TLS 1.2 for long-term support, >> one that represents what's already deployed for TLS 1.2 but with the >> security holes and bugs fixed. This represents a stable, known-good >> profile that can be deployed now to systems that can't can't roll out >> patches every month or two when the next attack on TLS is published. >> >> Several people have already commented on it off-list while it was being >> written, it's now open for general comments... > >Several comments: <snip> >The analysis of TLS 1.3 is just wrong. TLS 1.3 has been far more >extensively analyzed then TLS 1.2. It's almost like you don't believe >cryptography exists: that is a body of knowledge that can demonstrate >that protocols are secure, and which has been applied to the draft. This is patently untrue. There is a vast body of research analysing TLS 1.2 and earlier. A good survey article is here: https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/049 (but even this is quite out of date in several respects). The literature for TLS 1.3 is growing, but is an order of magnitude smaller in size. It is pretty much represented in its entirety by the list of presentations at the recent TRON workshop: http://www.internetsociety.org/events/ndss-symposium-2016/tls-13-ready-or-n ot-tron-workshop-programme As far as I know, the only complete analysis so far is this one: http://tls13tamarin.github.io/TLS13Tamarin/ (full disclosure: two of my PhD students are involved). However, even there, the analysis is symbolic and does not include 0-RTT (IIRC). Maybe you'd care to revise your bold statement above? Cheers Kenny _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
