On Fri, Apr 29, 2016 at 8:35 AM, Guballa, Jens (Nokia - DE) < [email protected]> wrote:
> Hi Eric, > > > > See below. > > > > *From:* TLS [mailto:[email protected]] *On Behalf Of *EXT Eric Rescorla > *Sent:* Dienstag, 26. April 2016 19:46 > *To:* [email protected] > *Subject:* [TLS] Review of draft-guballa-tls-terminology-03 > > > > I recently reviewed draft-guballa-tls-terminology-03. Comments below. > > > > OVERALL > > I'm sympathetic to concerns that TLS terminology may not be as precise > > as one would like, but IMO this document doesn't make things significantly > > clearer and in some cases makes it worse. Specifically: > > > > - (D)TLS is intentionally defined without any tight binding to the > underlying > > transport. However, this document tries to tie it to IP semantics, which > > is not helpful and doesn't match existing practice. > > *[JG] I don’t think this is consistently true for all (D)TLS related RFCs. > E.g. from RFC5764 (DTLS-SRTP), section 3: “A single DTLS-SRTP session only > protects data carried over a single UDP source and destination port pair.” * > > *The terminology draft has been based on the existing (D)TLS RFC landscape > so far and thus intends to represent a status quo. I quite agree that this > needs to be revised, given new technologies like WebRTC and “DTLS over > ICE”.* > Well, this isn't a DTLS requirement, at most it's a 5764 requirement, but even then, it's not something we're maintaining. > - This document introduces a number of terms that don't exist in the (D)TLS > > documents (e.g., "Transient (D)TLS session"). This is just going to cause > > confusion. > > *[JG] The intended rationale behind those terms: A hierarchical > information model has been created first, and the terms defined represent > that hierarchy. So even if those terms are not directly used in RFCs they > are essential from information model persepctive.* > Yeah, I'm not finding it helpful for comprehension. > > In general, I don't think that having a second document that acts as > > a glossary for (D)TLS but isn't part of the main documents is going to help > > much. If the authors feel like the terminology in TLS is imprecise, it > > would be more helpful to suggest changes to TLS 1.3 (e.g., via PRs). > > > > > > DETAILED COMENTS > > S 3.1.1. > > There's no restriction on TLS that a given endpoint is attached > > to one IP address, and in fact, it's common to run DTLS in > > multihomed configs (e.g., DTLS over ICE). > > > > S 3.2.1. > > Again, (D)TLS isn't bound to the port or IP. > > > > S 3.2.2. > > This whole notion of semi-permanent versus transient isn't helpful, > > especially in the face of tickets. > > *[JG] The terminology is reflecting the lifetime of a session and is by > intention independent on how session resumption is performed (tickets or > via base TLS RFC). * > > > > S 3.2.2. > > This is just a new invented term. Please don't > > > > S 3.3.1. > > Destruction point doesn't seem useful since in many cases it's "unknown" > > since it's in the future > > *[JG] That’s a good catch, thanks!* > > > > > > S 3.3.4. > > In DTLS you can respond to a ClientHello with a HelloVerifyRequest as > > well. > > *[JG] Again, good catch.* > > > > S 3.4.4. > > "message sequence" seems invented. > > > > S 3.4.7. > > I don't think it's helpful to import ITU notions of connection state here, > > especially in the face of stuff like false start. > > *[JG] I see your point, the states are separated in Rx and Tx direction. * > > > > S 3.4.12. > > Copying the session state here doesn't seem that useful, especially > splitting > > it into two states. > > *[JG] I see your point for repeating the session state in the draft. But I > think the server_address at the client side differentiates both objects.* > But this isn't a TLS concept. -Ekr > > *Thanks,* > > *Jens* >
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