Hi David & Nikos,

My comments are inlined in below mail, please check it.

-----Original Message-----
From: David Woodhouse [mailto:dw...@infradead.org] 
Sent: 19 September 2016 13:04
To: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos; Raja ashok; jayaraghavendra...@huawei.com
Subject: Re: draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension-01

On Sat, 2016-09-17 at 09:53 +0200, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote:
> Hello,
>  We were with David implementing the draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-
> extension-01 on openconnect VPN, however we noticed that the latest
> version of TLS 1.3 modified the identity extension in an incompatible
> way. I am not sure if the new format can be used in place of the old
> one. For that we would like to ask what is your plan about it. Would
> you include the new format with some guidance on how to be used under
> tls 1.2, or would you stick to the existing format?

[ashok]  : PSK Identity extension specified in our extension differs from the 
extension specified in TLS1.3. In TLS1.3 PSK identity extension they are trying 
to exchange whether its DHE based PSK or not and also authentication mechanism 
(PSK or cert based authentication), all these things for key_share extension. 
So that TLS1.3 has PskKeyExchangeModes and PskAuthenticationModes. But I hope 
these are not required for lower versions (TLS1.2, 1.1 and 1.0). So the 
extension proposed in this draft is only for usage with TLS1.2, 1.1 and 1.0. 
And I feel, we can make this as a separate extension to avoid confusion with 
TLS1.3 extension. If we feel anything needs to be inherited from TLS1.3 
extension, we can do it.

A couple of other comments on looking in detail at the draft...

RFC4279 §5.1 says that PSK identities MUST be a character string,
encoded in UTF-8.

But the TLSv1.3 draft doesn't say this anywhere, and in fact in §4.5.1
it seems to suggest that for session resumption, we use a ticket
constructed according to RFC5077 as the PSK identity. Which would
probably be binary.

If TLSv1.3 is going to allow non-UTF8 PSK identities and TLSv1.2 still
doesn't, then it would be useful to clarify precisely what is allowed
in draft-jay-tls-psk-identity-extension.

[ashok] : PSK identity extension specified in this draft also expects the PSK 
ID as character string in UTF format, similar to RFC 4279. I will update this 
point in our draft, thanks for reminding me.

Another difference I note between your draft and the current TLSv1.3
draft is that in TLSv1.3, the PreSharedKeyExtension data returned by
the server is just an index in the identities offered by the client;
not a copy of the identifier itself:

   struct {
       select (Handshake.msg_type) {
           case client_hello:
               PskIdentity identities<6..2^16-1>;

           case server_hello:
               uint16 selected_identity;
   } PreSharedKeyExtension;

   selected_identity     The server’s chosen identity expressed as a
                         (0-based) index into the identities in the
                         client’s list.

[ashok] : I feel sending the selected ID is better, otherwise while process 
"server hello" msg, client has to maintain the PSK ID list in the same order in 
which it sent. Already there was a discussion in TLS1.3 group for sending 
selected ID instead of index. 

And a final nitpick... replace every instance it "it's" with "its" :)

[ashok] : I will check and fix it. I will upload a revised draft. Thanks for 
your comments.

David Woodhouse                            Open Source Technology Centre
david.woodho...@intel.com                              Intel Corporation

Raja Ashok

E-mail: raja.as...@huawei.com
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