Hi, I am not very clear on how to update the text of the draft. The problem seems to me that code point restriction are hard to implement. As a result, the session is aborted with - insufficient_security(71) or equivalent - when the code point does not match the security strength. I am encline to think that we should also provide some profiles that achieve 128/256 bit security. These profiles may be described in this document or in another document more related to cryptographic recommendation. What would be the most appropriated way to move forward ?
BR, Daniel On Sun, Oct 9, 2016 at 2:59 AM, John Mattsson <john.matts...@ericsson.com> wrote: > Hi Dan, Sean, Nikos, > > First, let me state that I think requiring 128-bit key management for > AES-128 is quite reasonable. > > HTTP/2 [RFC7540] also has some related text in Section 9.2.1 that applies > when TLS is used for HTTP/2. "Endpoints MAY treat negotiation of key sizes > smaller than the lower limits as a connection error (Section 5.4.1 > <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7540#section-5.4.1>) of type > INADEQUATE_SECURITY." > > > I think this is a question for TLS in general, > draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead should just follow what the TLS WG decides > as the general way forward. Wether that is MAY/SHOULD/SHALL treat groups > with insufficient security as an error. > > I think the real problem here are TLS libraries supporting 1024 MODP and > 160 ECC at all, support for these should have been removed before 2010. > Nikos  recommends a RCF forbidding weak elliptic curves from TLS 1.2 > (i.e. WeakDH DieDieDie!!!). I think this is a great idea and much better > than bundling it into a code-point assignment RFC. (My current plans for > the next update of 3GPP’s TLS and DTLS profiles is simply to forbid > support of anything weaker than 2048 MODP and 255-bit ECC). > > . https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/4PZsc_Dy-aT299BYrlBKvZs0BOQ > > > > Cheers, > John > > > On 11/07/16 22:26, "TLS on behalf of Dan Harkins" <tls-boun...@ietf.org on > behalf of dhark...@lounge.org> wrote: > > > > > I'm glad I have to opportunity to make you happy Sean :-) > > > >On Mon, July 11, 2016 7:40 am, Sean Turner wrote: > >> I think I can take this bit: > >> > >> On Jul 10, 2016, at 06:51, Peter Dettman > >><peter.dett...@bouncycastle.org> > >> wrote: > >>> > >>> I'm also curious whether there is a precedent in other RFCs for an > >>> explicit minimum curve bits, or perhaps a de facto implementer's rule? > >> > >> I'd be happy to be wrong here. but to my knowledge no there's not been > >> an explicit minimum for curve bits. There have however been similar (at > >> least in my non-cryptographer mind) for RSA key sizes so if we wanted to > >> define an explicit minimum curve bits then we could. > > > > draft-ietf-tls-pwd-07 includes a RECOMMENDED practice of ensuring > >the curves used provide commensurate strength with the ciphersuite > >negotiated. Section 10, "Implementation Considerations", says: > > > > It is RECOMMENDED that implementations take note of the strength > > estimates of particular groups and to select a ciphersuite providing > > commensurate security with its hash and encryption algorithms. A > > ciphersuite whose encryption algorithm has a keylength less than the > > strength estimate, or whose hash algorithm has a blocksize that is > > less than twice the strength estimate SHOULD NOT be used. > > > > And I would like to take this opportunity to remind everyone that > >the only difference between TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 > >and TLS_ECCPWD_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 is that the latter is resistant > >to dictionary attack and the former is not. > > > > regards, > > > > Dan. > > > > > > > >_______________________________________________ > >TLS mailing list > >TLS@ietf.org > >https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >
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