On 05/03/2017 08:35 PM, Martin Thomson wrote: > On 4 May 2017 at 11:31, Salz, Rich <[email protected]> wrote: >> Well, for example, Chrome/boringSSL should arguably know better but are >> treating it all as one equivalent stream. >> >> Is FF/NSS doing the same thing? > Yes. > >> Why? > Because doing anything else makes it a lot harder for the application. > > I realize that you *want* that, but clearly we disagree about the > utility of API hurdles. Given that the application already took > extraordinary steps to enable 0-RTT, we don't think that adding > artificial hurdles is going to change things. >
A related question is whether NSS wants to be a general-purpose TLS library, or an HTTP-specific TLS library. I have mostly come to terms with the HTTP application profile for 0-RTT saying "combine the streams" (but still want to see it written down with a proper security analysis before it gets widespread), but other application profiles might do different things! Are you painting yourself into a corner? -Ben
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