Hi, Thanks Tim and Uri for the comment. At least wikipedia considers them as equivalent. I am fine either way, but leave it as pfs unless there is a consensus to change it to forward secrecy. If having fs seems important to you please let us know asap!
Yours, Daniel On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 5:01 PM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL < [email protected]> wrote: > It is a mathematical cryptographic term, and as such is incontrovertible. > > I say leave it in. > > Regards, > Uri > > Sent from my iPhone > > > On May 18, 2017, at 16:58, Timothy Jackson <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > > One small nit. > > > >> ECDHE provides perfect forward secrecy > > I thought we had decided to change “perfect forward secrecy” to just > “forward secrecy” since “perfect” is such a difficult standard to reach? > > > > Tim > > — > > Tim Jackson | Product Security Architect | MobileIron, Inc. > > > > On 5/18/17, 10:45 AM, "TLS on behalf of Daniel Migault" < > [email protected] on behalf of [email protected]> wrote: > > > > Hi Simon, > > > > Thank you for the review. I believe we have addressed your comments > in our version 04. Please see my comments inline. > > > > Yours, > > Daniel > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: TLS [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Simon > Friedberger > > Sent: Thursday, May 04, 2017 5:59 PM > > To: [email protected] > > Cc: [email protected] > > Subject: Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03.txt> > (ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer > Security (TLS)) to Proposed Standard > > > > Nits: > > > > RFC 4279 reference is missing. > > MGLT: It seems the reference is mentioned in the current version in > the Normative reference as well as in the introduction at line 127, in > section 3 line 143. In case you meant another reference, please let us know. > > > > > > > > "TLS 1.3 and above version, " should probably be "TLS 1.3 and > above" or "TLS 1.3 and higher versions" > > MGLT: Changed to "TLS 1.3 and higher versions" > > > >> On 04/05/17 18:41, The IESG wrote: > >> The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG > >> (tls) to consider the following document: > >> - 'ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer > >> Security (TLS)' > >> <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03.txt> as Proposed Standard > >> > >> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits > >> final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the > >> [email protected] mailing lists by 2017-05-18. Exceptionally, comments may > >> be sent to [email protected] instead. In either case, please retain the > >> beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting. > >> > >> Abstract > >> > >> > >> This document defines several new cipher suites for the Transport > >> Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The cipher suites are all based on > >> the Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with Pre-Shared Key > >> (ECDHE_PSK) key exchange together with the Authenticated Encryption > >> with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms AES-GCM and AES-CCM. PSK > >> provides light and efficient authentication, ECDHE provides perfect > >> forward secrecy, and AES-GCM and AES-CCM provides encryption and > >> integrity protection. > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> The file can be obtained via > >> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead/ > >> > >> IESG discussion can be tracked via > >> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead/ballot/ > >> > >> > >> No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D. > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> TLS mailing list > >> [email protected] > >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > > > > _______________________________________________ > > TLS mailing list > > [email protected] > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > > > > _______________________________________________ > > TLS mailing list > > [email protected] > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > TLS mailing list > > [email protected] > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > >
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