On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 4:53 AM, Toerless Eckert <t...@cs.fau.de> wrote:
> > Thanks. Just in case anyone is counting > I think thats a bad choice that limits the usefulness of 1.3. And it will > just > cause less security in systems where logging etc. is required than if this > was possible by apps to configure. > > Why can i negotiate a cipher suite without encryption but not disable cert > encryption ? > You won't be able to do that in TLS 1.3 either. We've removed all the non-encryption cipher suites (though someone could define more off the Standards Track). However, with that said, I don't think that this is a very good analogy. Having unencrypted certs even as an options would significantly impact the state machine, whereas null ciphers do not -Ekr > The argument you gave could equally be made to not permit a cipher suite > without encryption, > right ? > > Cheers > Toerless > > On Tue, Jun 06, 2017 at 09:59:16PM -0400, Dave Garrett wrote: > > Correct; certs are never in the clear. There is no scenario where > anything will be unencrypted after the hellos in TLS 1.3+. If you're doing > anything with an old system that relies on this, the general advice is to > upgrade your old system to not do that anymore. If you're logging traffic > from some server(s), log the traffic on those server(s) instead of MitMing. > See old threads for more detail. > > > > > > Dave > > > > > > On Tuesday, June 06, 2017 08:36:38 pm Toerless Eckert wrote: > > > So no options in TLS 1.3 that make it possible to see the server cert > in the clear ? > > > > > > On Sun, Jun 04, 2017 at 03:25:46PM -0500, Benjamin Kaduk wrote: > > > > On 06/02/2017 08:28 AM, Toerless Eckert wrote: > > > > > Another candidate use case coming to mind eg: auditing tht is > required in many eg: financial > > > > > environments. In the past i have seen even the requirement for the > whole data streams to be unencrypted > > > > > for auditing. Maybe that market segment would also be able to get > more privacy but maintain a > > > > > relevant level of auditing if the auditing relevant class of > information was visible via > > > > > the cert. > > > > > > > > That use case has been extensively discussed (look for the thread > > > > "Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3", also a fair bit of hallway > > > > discussions), and was not seen to provide a compelling argument for > any > > > > change in TLS 1.3. There are purely server-side options that should > be > > > > able to provide the necessary functionality (crypto details omitted > for > > > > now). > > -- > --- > t...@cs.fau.de >
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