On 07/09/2017 08:33 AM, Eric Rescorla wrote: > > > > Also, it considers Section 7.4.1.4 of RFC 5246, i.e. the same > extensions SHOULD be included in case of request for session > resumption. > > This also led to the design in the draft (i.e., the HMAC computed > by the client and the provisioning of a session key K_S), so that > the client does not require to contact the TA again in case of > intended session resumption. > > > It seems like if this is really important, the TA could just give the > client some small > number of tokens on initial contact. >
I wonder if the desired properties could be obtained by having the TA be a Kerberos KDC that only issues [Kerberos tickets targetting the TLS server's Kerberos principal] to [Kerberos clients that are authorized to speak TLS to the TLS server]. Then the TLS extension could just hold a Kerberos authenticator that binds to the client random and the client can reuse the kerberos ticket until it expires. -Ben
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