Hi, Hannes. I think it makes sense if the middlebox (whether a TLS proxy or a phone) cannot perform a MitM attack against the internal TLS. This can be achieved by having separate trust anchors for the application vs the ones used for HTTPS, specifically not including any “proxy CA certificate”.
Yoav > On 7 Nov 2017, at 17:15, Hannes Tschofenig <[email protected]> wrote: > > FWIW: I can tell you what the threat model was with the layered TLS work. > > Let me give you a very specific example. Imagine a Bluetooth Low Energy > device that communicates via a phone to a cloud-based service. The > communication from the phone to the cloud uses HTTPS. The communication > from the BLE device to the phone uses ordinary BLE > services/characteristics. > > The Layered TLS/application layer TLS would in this case run from the > BLE device all the way to the cloud-based service at the application layer. > > This allows us to provide end-to-end security across a proxy (in this > case the phone) and independent of the underlying protocols. > > Does this make sense? > > Ciao > Hannes > > > On 11/07/2017 10:21 AM, Alex C wrote: >> What exactly is the threat model here? >> >> Are you trying to hide a connection from a reverse proxy at the server >> end? If so, the server operator should not have deployed a reverse proxy >> in the first place. >> >> Are you trying to hide from a MITM proxy that supplies its own >> certificate? If so, then what prevents the proxy from doing the same to >> the tunnelled session? >> When MITM proxies learn to do that, will we create another tunnelling >> protocol inside this one? >> >> This is a cat-and-mouse game with middleboxes (much like the version >> negotiation problem, but in a different way). Keep playing and everyone >> loses. >> >> On Tue, Oct 31, 2017 at 11:17 AM, Richard Barnes <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>> wrote: >> >> Hey TLS folks, >> >> Owen, Max, and I have been kicking around some ideas for how to make >> secure connections in environments where HTTPS is subject to MitM / >> proxying. >> >> The below draft lays out a way to tunnel TLS over HTTPS, in hopes of >> creating a channel you could use when you really need things to be >> private, even from the local MitM. >> >> Feedback obviously very welcome. Interested in whether folks think >> this is a useful area in which to develop an RFC, and any thoughts >> on how to do this better. >> >> Thanks, >> --Richard >> >> >> On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 3:47 PM, <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]> >> <mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>> >> wrote: >> >> >> A new version of I-D, draft-friel-tls-over-http-00.txt >> has been successfully submitted by Owen Friel and posted to the >> IETF repository. >> >> Name: draft-friel-tls-over-http >> Revision: 00 >> Title: Application-Layer TLS >> Document date: 2017-10-30 >> Group: Individual Submission >> Pages: 20 >> URL: >> https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-friel-tls-over-http-00.txt >> <https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-friel-tls-over-http-00.txt> >> >> <https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-friel-tls-over-http-00.txt >> <https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-friel-tls-over-http-00.txt>> >> Status: >> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-friel-tls-over-http/ >> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-friel-tls-over-http/> >> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-friel-tls-over-http/ >> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-friel-tls-over-http/>> >> Htmlized: >> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-friel-tls-over-http-00 >> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-friel-tls-over-http-00> >> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-friel-tls-over-http-00 >> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-friel-tls-over-http-00>> >> Htmlized: >> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-friel-tls-over-http-00 >> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-friel-tls-over-http-00> >> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-friel-tls-over-http-00 >> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-friel-tls-over-http-00>> >> >> >> Abstract: >> Many clients need to establish secure connections to application >> services but face challenges establishing these connections >> due to >> the presence of middleboxes that terminate TLS connections >> from the >> client and restablish new TLS connections to the service. This >> document defines a mechanism for transporting TLS records in HTTP >> message bodies between clients and services. This enables >> clients >> and services to establish secure connections using TLS at the >> application layer, and treat any middleboxes that are >> intercepting >> traffic at the network layer as untrusted transport. In >> short, this >> mechanism moves the TLS handshake up the OSI stack to the >> application >> layer. >> >> >> >> >> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time >> of submission >> until the htmlized version and diff are available at >> tools.ietf.org <http://tools.ietf.org/> <http://tools.ietf.org >> <http://tools.ietf.org/>>. >> >> The IETF Secretariat >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> TLS mailing list >> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >> <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls> >> <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >> <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>> >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> TLS mailing list >> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >> <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls> >> > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>
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