On Thu, 2018-03-01 at 21:52 +0000, Paterson, Kenny wrote:
> Hi,
> I've been analysing the record protocol spec for TLS 1.3 a bit,
> specifically the new padding mechanism. I think there's a possible
> timing attack on a naïve implementation of de-padding. Maybe this is
> already known to people who've been paying more attention than me!
> Recall that the padding mechanism permits an arbitrary number of 00
> bytes to be added after the plaintext and content type byte, up to
> the max record size. This data is then encrypted using whichever AEAD
> scheme is specified in the cipher suite. This padding scheme is quite
> important for TLS 1.3 because the current AEAD schemes do leak the
> length of record plaintexts. There should be no padding oracle style
> attack possible because of the integrity guarantees of the AEAD
> schemes in use. 
> The idea for the timing attack is as follows. 
> The natural way to depad (after AEAD decryption) is to remove the 00
> bytes at the end of the plaintext structure one by one, until a non-
> 00 byte is encountered. This is then the content type byte. Notice
> that the amount of time needed to execute this depadding routine
> would be proportional to the number of padding bytes. If there's some
> kind of response record for this record, then measuring the time
> taken from reception of the target record to the appearance of the
> response record can be used to infer information about the amount of
> padding, and thereby, the true length of the plaintext (since the
> length of the padded plaintext is known from the ciphertext length).
> The timing differences here would be small. But they could be
> amplified by various techniques. For example, the cumulative timing
> difference over many records could allow leakage of the sum of the
> true plaintext lengths. Think of a client browser fetching a simple
> webpage from a browser. The page is split over many TLS records, each
> of which is individually padded, with the next GET request from the
> client being the "response record". (This is a pretty simplistic view
> of how a web browser works, I know!). The total timing difference
> might then be sufficient for webpage fingerprinting, for example. 
> I'm not claiming this is a big issue, but maybe something worth
> thinking about and addressing in the TLS 1.3 spec.
> There's at least a couple of ways to avoid the problem:
> 1. Do constant-time depadding - by examining every byte in the
> plaintext structure even after the first non-00 byte is encountered. 
> 2. Add an explicit padding length field at the end of the plaintext
> structure, and removing padding without checking its contents. (This
> should be safe because of the AEAD integrity guarantees.) 
> Option 2 is probably a bit invasive at this late stage in the
> specification process. Maybe a sentence or two on option 1 could be
> added to the spec.

 It was brought previously to the WG [0], and the bottom line was to push
for any solution to implementations.

As of the "naïve implementation of de-padding", I wouldn't put like that.
It is a straightforward method of de-padding after reading the draft, and
I believe all implementations out there use that method.



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