> On Mar 6, 2018, at 12:27, Ben Campbell <b...@nostrum.com> wrote:
> Ben Campbell has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: Yes
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> There has clearly been a lot of work put into this. It's a surprisingly
> understandable document, given its length and the complexity of the subject. I
> am balloting yes, but I have a few minor comments and nits. None of these are
> showstoppers, so please do with them as you will.
> *** Substantive Comments:
> §4.1.2, first paragraph: " When a client first connects to a server, it is
> REQUIRED to send the
>   ClientHello as its first message. "
> Is that intended to prohibit the use of STARTTLS or similar application layer
> patterns? (To be clear, this is not an objection, just a clarification 
> request.)

No - this is just how it works TLS - clients send the ClientHello message first 

> §4.1.2, legacy_compression_methods: "Note that TLS 1.3 servers might receive
> TLS 1.2 or prior
>      ClientHellos which contain other compression methods and MUST
>      follow the procedures for the appropriate prior version of TLS."
> Is that intended to require TLS 1.3 servers to always be willing and able to
> negotiate 1.2? §4.2.1 has a similar assertion:
> "If this extension is not present, servers which are compliant with
>   this specification MUST negotiate TLS 1.2 or prior as specified in
>   [RFC5246], even if ClientHello.legacy_version is 0x0304 or later."
> But §4.2.3 says:
> "Note that TLS 1.2 defines this extension differently.  TLS 1.3
>   implementations willing to negotiate TLS 1.2 MUST behave in
>   accordance with the requirements of [RFC5246] when negotiating that
>   version."
> ... which seems inconsistent (noting that this paragraph talks about
> "implementations" rather than "servers", so perhaps there's a subtle 
> difference?

In short kinda, sorta yes: §s4.2.1 includes the following:

   Implementations of TLS 1.3 which choose to support prior versions of
   TLS SHOULD support TLS 1.2.

Not sure it’s inconsistent given that the 2nd quote is about the server needs 
to do with the information it’s getting from the client.

> § The section is marked for removal. Do you expect that RFC
> implementations will ever need to interop with draft implementations? If so,
> the information in this section may continue to be useful for some time.

I think it’ll be useful for about as long as it takes for them to rev their 
code bases, which I am sure hoping is faster than the 6 or so weeks it’ll take 
for this draft to get to through the RFC editor’s queue.

> §D.5: This section has a lot of normative requirements that seem important. I
> wonder why it has been relegated to an appendix.

§D.5 is about backward compatibility and though we negotiations with 1.2 is a 
SHOULD we say nada about earlier versions.  And, we don’t want to say anything 
about earlier versions.   And, some of this is technically repeated from other 
RFCs, eg. 5768 and 6176 saying don’t do SSL2/3. So, it ended up in an appendix.

> *** Editorial Comments and nits:
> §2: "If (EC)DHE key establishment
>   is in use, then the ServerHello contains a "key_share" extension with
>   the server’s ephemeral Diffie-Hellman share which MUST be in the same
>   group as one of the client’s shares. "
> missing comma prior to "which”.

(grammar police are banging on my door as we speak)
So is the which clause restrictive or non restrictive?  I’m going with this 
this clause being restrictive (hence no comma).

> §4.1.1: "Note that if the PSK can be used without (EC)DHE then non-
>   overlap in the "supported_groups" parameters need not be fatal, as it
>   is in the non-PSK case discussed in the previous paragraph."
> I read "need not be fatal" to mean that it may still be fatal at times. Is 
> that
> the intent?

Yes that is the intent.

> §11: The IANA considerations have a number of constructions similar to "SHALL
> update/has updated". Is that text expected to collapse to "has updated" at 
> some
> point?

Yes - once we’ve gotten the a-okay from IANA, well as the RFC editor to make it 
just say “has updated” etc.

> §E.2.1: [BDFKPPRSZZ16]  : Best citation anchor evar


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