The following errata report has been rejected for RFC5246, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2".
-------------------------------------- You may review the report below and at: http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5409 -------------------------------------- Status: Rejected Type: Technical Reported by: Eugene Adell <[email protected]> Date Reported: 2018-06-26 Rejected by: Benjamin Kaduk (IESG) Section: Appendix A.5 Original Text ------------- Note: The cipher suite values { 0x00, 0x1C } and { 0x00, 0x1D } are reserved to avoid collision with Fortezza-based cipher suites in SSL 3. Corrected Text -------------- Note: The cipher suite values { 0x00, 0x1C } and { 0x00, 0x1D } are reserved to avoid collision with Fortezza-based cipher suites in SSL 3. The cipher suite value { 0x00, 0x1E } firstly also assigned to Fortezza has been released and has since been be reassigned. Notes ----- RFC 2712 (Addition of Kerberos Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security) in its Draft 01 version introduces three new cipher suites colliding with the three Fortezza ones. The Draft 02 version partially corrects that, by moving the Kerberos cipher suites values by two. This omission of the third cipher suite has never been corrected, and this remains in the same state in the final RFC 2712, RFC 2246 and its successors including this one. Changing the first Kerberos cipher suite value, or moving all of them, would now not make any sense. Enhancing the note as suggested is probably enough to mention how one Fortezza cipher suite disappeared. --VERIFIER NOTES-- RFC 5246 is not the appropriate location to document this conflict. -------------------------------------- RFC5246 (draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-10) -------------------------------------- Title : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2 Publication Date : August 2008 Author(s) : T. Dierks, E. Rescorla Category : PROPOSED STANDARD Source : Transport Layer Security Area : Security Stream : IETF Verifying Party : IESG _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
