Okay, a modern browser connecting to a server owned by billion dollar
corporations are able to implement the latest version of TLS, I’ll concede
that. Regardless, I can only underline one point: any new protocol needs to
break both compatibility and be downgradable, and require a small amount of
code. It probably wasn’t wrong for the average browser implementation to
downgrade upon connection failure before, it certainly seem more sound than
any gritty details of recent protocol design.

Furthermore, TLS 1.2 is perfectly fine, and so is TLS 1.3 by everyone’s
statements. If so, a new protocol has no need to quickly replace either one
of them, but instead have a high likelihood of being superior and simpler,
and performs better according to current design of the internet.

And possibly list recommendations for how out of scope issues could be
resolved in a subsection for the inevitable RFC describing it. Boot entropy
can be solved by increasing boot times by one second. Reminders of various
Javascript functions to ensure authenticity. Etc.

Google’s idea to rush out experimental protocols looks disgusting to me.
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