I like the gist of what Tony is saying. Key escrow (it should be called
"secret escrow", but I digress) itself is not really the problem in a
datacenter - those guys struggle to solve the key distribution problem. If it
was one-server-to-one-tool then we would not be having this discussion. eTLS
looks like an attempt to simplify the key distribution implementation, but at
the expense of the security attributes of the TLS session. Why don't we provide
a "sandbox" mechanism that would allow business-solution folks to solve the key
distribution problem without directly affecting the TLS session? What I have
in mind is a TLS extension that would unlock a new TLS record ContentType
called "foo" (for lack of a name). All "foo" records will be completely
ignored by the TLS stack, including not affecting the TLS record sequence
number or crypto state. That mechanism can then be used to send in-band
messages that could be picked up by inline and passive tools along the way.
Mechanisms that use "foo" records could potentially be designed outside the
IETF, and the TLS-WG would have no responsibility for insecure implementations
of multi-party secret sharing mechanisms (although it would be good to point
those engineers in the right direction). --Roelof ---- On Wed, 05 Dec 2018
10:51:26 -0500 Tony Arcieri <basc...@gmail.com> wrote ---- On Wed, Dec 5, 2018
at 12:09 AM Bret Jordan <jordan.i...@gmail.com> wrote: Now this WG is finally
starting to talk about a solution to a real problem and need. We can either
address the use case and need here in the IETF, or we can let the solutions be
done else where. I would personally prefer we take this work item back and
solve it here in the IETF. [...] On Dec 5, 2018, at 1:18 AM, Tony Arcieri
<basc...@gmail.com> wrote: [...] It seems like with an out-of-band escrow
agent, the traffic secrets could be escrowed with no changes to TLS. Note that
the solution I was proposing here requires no changes to TLS. I am sure that
there are many in the IETF who would be happy with people exploring solutions
which don't require changes to TLS. Here are some others: Endpoint agents (OSS
- commercial options are also available): https://osquery...io/
https://www.bro.org/ (now Zeek) https://wazuh.com/ Encrypted traffic analytics:
https://blogs.cisco.com/security/tls-version-1-3-change-is-here-and-encrypted-traffic-analytics-has-got-your-back
-- Tony Arcieri _______________________________________________ TLS mailing
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