Weird. I sent this message this morning, and it did not arrive on the list.
On 5/22/2019 1:09 AM, Christian Huitema wrote: > On 5/15/2019 6:20 AM, Joseph Salowey wrote: >> The last call has come and gone without any comment. Please indicate >> if you have reviewed the draft even if you do not have issues to >> raise so the chairs can see who has reviewed it. Also indicate if >> you have any plans to implement the draft. >> >> On Tue, Apr 9, 2019 at 8:51 PM Joseph Salowey <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> This is the working group last call for the "TLS 1.3 Extension >> for Certificate-based Authentication with an External Pre-Shared >> Key” draft available >> at >> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk/. >> Please review the document and send your comments to the list by >> 2359 UTC on 23 April 2019. >> > > My only comment regards the trade-off in this draft between privacy > and resilience. The proposed method uses PSK to provide greater > resilience against quantum-capable attackers, and as Russ says this is > something that the US government cares about. But at the same time, > the use of PSK requires inserting a PSK-ID in the client hello, which > is sent in clear text. So we have a trade-off: government > communications are less likely to be decrypted, but the PSK-ID will > help track government employees. It might make sense to describe the > trade-off explicitly in the draft, maybe in the security section. > > -- Christian Huitema >
_______________________________________________ TLS mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
