Hi all, working on the DTLS connection id drafts we noticed that there is one security aspect, which could benefit from an extra mitigation technique.
The issue is that an on-path adversary could intercept and modify the source IP address (and the source port) of a DTLS datagram. Even if receiver checks the authenticity and freshness of the packet, the recipient is fooled into changing the CID-to-IP/port association. This can lead to black-holed or redirected traffic. Of course, an on-path adversary can do lots of things to traffic and the problem is self-fixing but it still lead us to work on a solution in form of a return-routability check. Here is the draft: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tschofenig-tls-dtls-rrc-00 Ciao Hannes IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
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