The document s with the IESG, and it should soon be in IETF Last Call. I will address these as early IETF Last Call comments when that happens.
Russ > On Jul 18, 2019, at 12:01 PM, Hammell, Jonathan F > <[email protected]> wrote: > > <>Classification: UNCLASSIFIED > > I realize publication has been requested for this draft, but I have a few > comments that the author might want to address, if still possible. > > 1. The draft says that if none of the PSKs provided by the client are > acceptable to the server, then the extension must be omitted from the > ServerHello message. Nothing is said about how the client should behave if > it receives this: continue or abort with what error code? > > 2. It can be detected if two PSK identifiers sent in the same ClientHello > have the same PSK value by observing the binder values. Granted, I can't > think why this would occur, but it might be important to point this out in > the Security Considerations in order for implementers to be clear about > security guarantees. > > 3. Section 4, paragraph 3 states that "If none of the external > PSKs in the list provided by the client is acceptable to the server, > then the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension is omitted from the > ServerHello message." > > Section 5 has a similar statement but using the word "MUST": "If none of the > offered external PSKs in the list provided by the client are > acceptable to the server, then the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" > extension MUST be omitted from the ServerHello message." > > These statements should be consistent in the requirement language. > > 4. Section 5, paragraph starting with "The identities are a list of external > PSK identities...": s/identities may be know to other parties/identities may > be known to other parties > > > Best regards, > Jonathan > > -- > Jonathan Hammell > Canadian Centre for Cyber Security > [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > > > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>
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