Hi Mike,
On Sat, Oct 10, 2020 at 01:29:13PM -0400, Michael D'Errico wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 9, 2020, at 17:22, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > [...] The behavior we should demand from our cryptographic
> > constructions is that the cryptography itself correctly returns
> > "valid" or "invalid" based on the input message, provided that
> > the application inputs the correct key material. (It should also
> > return "invalid" if incorrect key material is supplied, of course.)
> > The ability to produce two different messages for which the
> > cryptography returns "valid" violates this principle; even if we
> > do not see an obvious path by which a reasonable application
> > might supply those inputs to the cryptographic code, it is still
> > a flawed construction.
>
> Hi,
>
> I'd like clarification about this point, where the cryptography
> should return values of "valid" or "invalid". This is a general
> question, not specifically about this draft. (Please read at
> least the next 2 paragraphs.)
>
> I remember a long time ago, it may have been the renegotiation
> info extension, where there was a lot of calculation being done,
> there were two complicated values each side had to compute.
> If they were equal, then everything was fine and the handshake
> could proceed. If not, there was an insecure renegotiation
> happening. (Or maybe it was the downgrade protection RFC,
> I can't remember now.) But if the values were not equal, then
> something bad was happening and the handshake should not
> proceed.
>
> The problem both Martin Rex and I discovered at nearly the
> same time (posts to the mailing list within minutes of each
> other) was that both sides could go through all the motions
> faithfully calculating all of the values, correctly, and then
> forget to compare them to see if the values were actually
> the same. I noticed this because I wrote the code, and it
> seemed like an easy thing to overlook.
>
> I remember suggesting that we somehow incorporate the
> calculated values into the derivation of the record layer keys
> so the MAC would fail, or maybe into the Finished message
> calculation so (if you remember to check that?) a failure is
> noticed later. This suggestion was shot down by the author
> unilaterally for what I perceived at the time to be petty
> reasons.
>
> I still believe that (D)TLS security should not rely on the
> implementer to check whether two values are equal. This
> is too easy to forget to do. Or you could do this in C:
>
> if (complex_value_a = complex_value_b) {
> // we're in trouble....
> }
>
> I have not looked at the TLS 1.3 draft beyond the hour or so
> I've put in so far to see whether this reliance on checking is
> in there too. I've also not checked whether the security
The TLS 1.3 handshake transcript is an input to the key schedule; manual
comparison of generated values is not necessary for security.
I would encourage you to continue in your efforts reading RFC 8446 -- in my
opinion we put quite a bit of effort in towards making it readable. (With,
perhaps, the exception of stateless HelloRetryRequest as you have already
noted, since the main expected use case is in DTLS.)
-Ben
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