Jonathan:

Thanks for the review.

> Here are my comments on the draft.
> 
> 1. Section 4 covers a lot of ground and is difficult to follow.  I
> suggest it be split into subsections (e.g. "4.1 PSKs Shared with
> Multiple Group Members" and "4.2 Weak Entropy PSKs") and move the
> attack description to an appendix.

I just reread it, and I think that the flow is okay.  It is about 2 pages.  
That said, I can see it dividing into two clean subsections.  I'd prefer to 
leave the attack in the body of the first subsection.

> 2. In Section 4, para 2, the reference "As discussed in Section 6"
> refers to the use case of provisioning where multiple clients or
> servers share the same PSK, but Section 6 covers all use cases (and
> also provisioning). I suggest to create a couple more subsections for
> clarity and accurate referencing: "6.1 Use Cases for Pair-wise
> External PSKs" and "6.2 Use Cases for PSKs Shared with Multiple
> Entities", shifting the provisioning sections to 6.3 and 6.4.  Then
> the Section 4 citation can refer to Section 6.2.

I think your only concern is the granularity of the forward reference. I'm not 
sure most people would be confused.

> 3. Section 7, item 4 is missing a word.  s/This protects an attacker
> from/This protects against an attacker from/

Against the original text: s/protects/prevents/

> 4. Since there is no mitigation against revealing PSK identity, it is
> more accurate to rename Section 5 "Privacy Concerns".

How about "Privacy Considerations"?

> 5. Section 4, para starting with "Finally, in addition to these...":
> s/may negatively affects deployments/may negatively affect
> deployments/

Agreed.

> 6. Section 5, para 1: I don't think "oppress" is the right word to use
> here.  Perhaps, "suppress" would be better.

Agreed.

> 7. In Section 6, the last paragraph refers to Section 7 as the final
> sentence.  I assume this reference is for the recommendation to not
> share a PSK between more than one node, but it is not clear.  The
> previous sentence says do not share PSKs "even if other accommodations
> are made", but this conflicts with item 2 of Section 7 which says do
> not share PSKs "unless other accommodations are made".

How about:

   The exact provisioning process depends on the system requirements and
   threat model.  Whenever possible, avoid sharing a PSK between nodes;
   however, sharing a PSK among several node is sometimes unavoidable.
   When PSK sharing happens, other accommodations as needed as
   discussed in Section 7.

> 8. It is not clear why "client certificate authentication after
> PSK-based connection establishment", mentioned at the end of Section
> 6, is not a sufficient accommodation.  Should it be added to Section
> 7, item 2?

Agreed,

> 9. Section 7.1.2, first para, s/clash/collide

That is better.

> 10. Section 7.1.2 describes a possible concern regarding PSK identity
> collisions, but it does not provide a recommendation/mitigation for
> vendors or users.  What should the reader do with this information?

It means the application, not the stack need to handle the collision by 
following the advice in the document.

> 11. Section 6, item 2: the term "logical nodes" is not defined.

I suggest dropping "logical"

Russ

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