Hi David, thanks for your feedback.
On 11/19/21 2:07 PM, David Benjamin wrote:
I think that's right. There's not much benefit to adding
supported_versions to a TLS-1.2-only stack. We introduced it in TLS 1.3
because of compatibility issues and because it was more flexible and
less prone to compatibility issues going forward. The forward-looking
benefits don't really apply here (TLS 1.2 has already been updated as
TLS 1.3), and TLS 1.2 version intolerance was (painstakingly) cleared
out already. (To that end, I'd suggest changing Section 3.1.3
of rfc7525bis. The old insecure version fallbacks are no more.)
Already done in our working copy... :-)
https://github.com/yaronf/I-D/pull/258/files
There's nothing /wrong/ with implementing supported_versions in TLS 1.2.
It's, in fact, one of the steps in implementing TLS 1.3. It's just not
very useful beyond that. Thus, in a document of recommendations for TLS
1.2 operators, there's no need to include it. (Note the absence of a
recommendation doesn't mean we recommend against it.)
Agreed.
On the bright side, just think: eventually we'll publish 7525ter and it
won't need to talk about TLS 1.2 at all!
Peter
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