On Dec 1, 2021, at 18:11,
bigtechantitrust<[email protected]> wrote:
Dear Members,
Disclaimer: The comments herein are my own opinions and are personal
conclusions I’ve arrived at based on simply reasoning things out as I see them.
Any insinuation at motive is purely my speculation, except for my claim that
one person involved admitted that financial motivation was a factor at his
organization, Akamai. That is on the record and archived. I also suspect that
not everyone is responsible and probably most members are being duped and used
as pawns here.
I’m writing to you with some criticisms of TLS 1.3, specifically ECH.
Within 5 seconds of analyzing the high-level design of ECH, I knew it was a
horrible idea because it would enable and normalize fully opaque encrypted
connections that even the origin machine administrator could not pry into if
they wanted to. This is done by design, and it is stated so implicitly and
explicitly.
When I started reading more about the people and organizations behind the
draft, I came across a multitude of articles by some praising their own efforts
and selling the draft hard. Chief among their reasoning was that “middle boxes
are evil”. Right there I knew something nefarious was going on because the
chief proponents are, by definition, middleboxes. So, what they really mean is
“anyone but us are evil.” This immediately stinks of something that should be
the subject of an antitrust investigation, but we’ll come back to that later.
Allow me to make clear my criticisms with a simple illustration.
DoH to get address of middlebox (the Good Guys™, not the bad guys!) -> Opaque
Start ECH -> Opaque
DoH to complete ECH -> Opaque
As a bonus, the keys swapped over DoH are ephemeral at non-deterministic
intervals, an action that is explicitly described in the draft as a means to
frustrate efforts to glean anything about these connections.
At the end of the day, even if I were executing smack in the middle of the
network stack in a kernel driver on the origin machine, it is impossible for me
to know anything about this type of connection and this practice has been
normalized, so I have zero discriminators available to me. All I know is
destination IP addresses, which are addresses of boxes that hide the real
destination and data by design.
Toss in pinned certificates at any point here and the loop is inescapably
closed and 100% opaque to Ring 0. Forget Management Engine, I guess the working
group (or rather the mega corps pushing this through an open standards body)
are the new Ring -1. The cybercriminals who cost businesses billions of dollars
per year and ruin countless lives are going to love this and they’re on the
edge of their seats salivating waiting for you to get this done and widely
distributed. But that’s the point, isn’t it?
One of the members admitted in an OpenSSL bug ticket (the comments are
preserved in an archive, as they have since been deleted) that there was a
financial motivation to get this draft done within his organization, Akamai. I
believe him, because this entire system is absurd within any other context and
anyone being honest can see that. It’s not to evade surveillance or censorship
from evil regimes (despite that being a claim made by the Akamai rep), because
most of those state actors have already successfully defeated draft
implementations of ECH and its predecessor ESNI and even those that have not,
will with enough time and energy and you know it.
As an aside, I think we’re all well beyond being hoodwinked with the “but think
of [victim group]!” We’ve mostly all figured out that whenever corporations,
especially corporations run by white people, are screaming about protecting a
minority, they also coincidentally gain money and power in every such endeavor,
like this one. The same company where the rep claimed ECH was to help
homosexuals in the middle east also has dealings with the Chinese Communist
Party, who is actively engaged in genocide and threatening to erase Japan from
the planet with nuclear weapons.
So, if Akamai is so concerned about activism, maybe Akamai can use their office
in China to stop forced abortions and sterilization of Uighurs, on-demand
murder for organ harvesting and the threat of the extermination of the Japanese
people in their own back yard before they want to push ECH to get richer uhh
err I mean to save homosexuals in the middle east, but I digress.
So why march forward? There is only a single reason that makes sense to me to
continue with this draft and I sort of already spoiled the surprise.
Money. Monopoly. A system like this will nullify virtually all existing network
cybersec technologies as they are today, except for some of the member’s
systems of course. This will conveniently, I’m sure accidently, expertly create
a perfect monopoly on network cybersec, a market the major proponents are
already engaged in and are even actively acquiring companies that specialize in
this field.
Furthermore, ECH will not enhance the privacy of individuals, it will transfer
the privacy of individuals exclusively to the same actors. The inescapable
result is total dominance of the two most lucrative businesses in the digital
space today: data mining and security.
Go ahead, just start googling “[company] + security or cybersecurity” for each
of the companies that the proponents of ECH in this group represent. They’re
all aggressively expanding and transforming from being middleboxes into
cybersec and big data companies all around the timing of ESNI and ECH.
What’s worse is that the apparent greed has created a tunnel vision that
entirely fails to consider injured interests that would not be in competition
with the monopoly being created here.
“Sorry ma’am, your child safety software couldn’t prevent your daughter from
talking with a predator because it couldn’t see that network traffic and
frankly, we have no clue who to even subpoena for records to find her because
the true destination of the forum was 100% encrypted. But hey, isn’t it great
that [identifiable group] can’t be persecuted in [horrible regime territory]
for just being themselves even though this system responsible for protecting
the predator is entirely non-functional in [horrible regime territory]! Gee,
the TLS working group are a bunch of amazing people and society is better
because of them! They thank your daughter for her sacrifice toward a better
world.”
-Some future detective probably
This draft is irredeemable. Regardless of your motivations, it is entirely
unacceptable to engineer a pillar of the internet in such a way that completely
robs the owner of a device or network to have the ability to glean any
information whatsoever about a connection it hosts. This enables non-elevated
executable code to have more privilege over something on a device than the
kernel itself. This hides more information from the host than TOR does. That is
an abomination.
I hope that this attempt to use the working group to hard-code special
interest’s business models into the fabric of the internet and create permanent
walled gardens for them will stop now. If not, then I hope the ensuing
antitrust investigations around the world are exceedingly destructive and
sufficiently cleanses open standard groups of actors who would do such a thing.
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