I think TLS should register all algorithm variants standardized by NIST. That means ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, and ML-KEM-1024. And in the future a subset of HQC/BIKE/Classic McEliece.
I think the TLS discussions are way too focused on a single ephemeral key exchange. A growing use of TLS is for mutually authenticated interfaces. When IPsec is used, rekeying is typically done with ephemeral key exchange every 1 hour or 100 GB following ANSSI requirements. The telecom industry would like to keep that practice when TLS/DTLS/QUIC is used instead. In TLS 1.3 that means resumption with psk_dhe_ke. I don’t think you need to use the same algorithm in the initial handshake and the resumption. You can e.g., use ML-KEM-1024 + x25519 in the initial handshake and then ML-KEM-512 in resumption. You could also use McEliece initially and then ML-KEM. I think you could even use ML-KEM + x25519 in the initial handshake and then x25519 during resumption. I think these choices should be left to the application. Cheers, John Preuß Mattson Sent from Outlook for iOS<https://aka.ms/o0ukef> ________________________________ From: TLS <tls-boun...@ietf.org> on behalf of John Mattsson <john.mattsson=40ericsson....@dmarc.ietf.org> Sent: Wednesday, March 6, 2024 4:57:10 PM To: Deirdre Connolly <durumcrustu...@gmail.com> Cc: TLS@ietf.org <tls@ietf.org> Subject: Re: [TLS] ML-KEM key agreement for TLS 1.3 Thanks Deirdre, I would like to use hybrid but I strongly believe that registering things as standalone NamedGroups and then let TLS negotiate which combinations to use is the right one long-term. This is the approch chosen be IKEv2. - As EKR pointed out the word "fully" would need explanation. - We align with [hybrid] except that instead of joining ECDH options with a KEM, we just have the KEM as a NamedGroup. I don't understand. We align with hybrid by not being hybrid? - encapsulated shared secret ciphertext Maybe shared secret encapsulated in the ciphertext? Cheers, John From: TLS <tls-boun...@ietf.org> on behalf of Eric Rescorla <e...@rtfm.com> Date: Wednesday, 6 March 2024 at 16:12 To: Deirdre Connolly <durumcrustu...@gmail.com> Cc: TLS@ietf.org <tls@ietf.org> Subject: Re: [TLS] ML-KEM key agreement for TLS 1.3 Deirdre, thanks for submitting this. Can you say what the motivation is for being "fully post-quantum" rather than hybrid? Thanks, -Ekr On Tue, Mar 5, 2024 at 6:16 PM Deirdre Connolly <durumcrustu...@gmail.com<mailto:durumcrustu...@gmail.com>> wrote: I have uploaded a preliminary version of ML-KEM for TLS 1.3<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-connolly-tls-mlkem-key-agreement/> and have a more fleshed out<https://protect2.fireeye.com/v1/url?k=31323334-501d5122-313273af-454445555731-864093ca9ffba626&q=1&e=c11b4b5f-f194-49c4-a720-c34e25cc52c2&u=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fdconnolly%2Fdraft-tls-mlkem-key-agreement> version to be uploaded when datatracker opens. It is a straightforward new `NamedGroup` to support key agreement via ML-KEM-768 or ML-KEM-1024, in a very similar style to -hybrid-design<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design/>. It will be nice to have pure-PQ options (that are FIPS / CNSA 2.0 compatible) ready to go when users are ready to use them. Cheers, Deirdre _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org<mailto:TLS@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
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