The revised draft https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa/ addresses comments from Alicja and Illari. Further, comments and suggestions are welcome.
-Tiru ---------- Forwarded message --------- From: <[email protected]> Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2024 at 11:07 Subject: New Version Notification for draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa-01.txt To: Tirumaleswar Reddy.K <[email protected]>, John Gray < [email protected]>, Scott Fluhrer <[email protected]>, Timothy Hollebeek <[email protected]> A new version of Internet-Draft draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa-01.txt has been successfully submitted by Tirumaleswar Reddy and posted to the IETF repository. Name: draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa Revision: 01 Title: Use of Composite ML-DSA in TLS 1.3 Date: 2024-11-26 Group: Individual Submission Pages: 10 URL: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa-01.txt Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa/ HTML: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa-01.html HTMLized: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa Diff: https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa-01 Abstract: This document specifies how the post-quantum signature scheme ML-DSA [FIPS204], in combination with traditional algorithms RSA- PKCS#1v1.5,RSA-PSS, ECDSA, Ed25519, and Ed448 can be used for authentication in TLS 1.3. The composite ML-DSA approach is beneficial in deployments where operators seek additional protection against potential breaks or catastrophic bugs in ML-DSA. The IETF Secretariat
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