I support adoption -- I think it is important to have conservatively designed PQ-safe cryptographic algorithms (Sphincs+, Classic McEliece, etc) widely available as fallback. Having them available takes away some arguments against deploying less conservative designed PQ algorithms that I'm seeing.
/Simon Sean Turner <s...@sn3rd.com> writes: > We are continuing with our WG adoption calls for the following I-D: > Use of SLH-DSA in TLS 1.3 [1]; see [2] for more information about this > tranche of adoption calls. If you support adoption and are willing to > review and contribute text, please send a message to the list. If you > do not support adoption of this draft, please send a message to the > list and indicate why. This call will close at 2359 UTC on 30 May > 2025. > > Reminder: This call for adoption has nothing to do with picking the > mandatory-to-implement cipher suites in TLS. > > Cheers, > Joe and Sean > > [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-reddy-tls-slhdsa/ > [2] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/KMOTm_lE5OIAKG8_chDlRKuav7c/ > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org > To unsubscribe send an email to tls-le...@ietf.org
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