> Just to clarify my position a little, based on what some others  
> have said: I'd prefer this not be published at all for a few years  
> at least.
> 
> I'd also prefer we develop a security area BCP that covers the  
> hybrid vs. pure KEMs topic and make that a normative reference  
> for all RFCs documenting pure PQ KEMs.
> 
> Much worse than either of the above would be to add specific text  
> to this document saying we prefer hybrids. But at the very least  
> that has to be done. If that's done soon and there's another WGLC  
> for this document, I'll still oppose publication on the basis of  
> the 1st two reasons above.

+1, especially to the first two paragraphs.

I might be convinced to agree to publication for the sole purpose of early 
experimentation with designated code points.
That is, IF we find a method (or combination of multiple thereof) to make 
absolutely sure that everyone using this is aware of the risks, which I 
currently doubt is possible.

-- TBB

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