> We should admit that the CA infrastructure has failed us for nearly all > use-cases. Either the CA infrastructure is the web, and (despite the CA/B > forum > rules) it's OK to use web certs in non-web contexts. Or, the CA > infrastructure is more than the web, and we need to have new,, non-web CAs > with rules > outside of the CA/B forum.
There are tons of CAs outside of the WebPKI/CA/B Forum ecosystem. For web and non-web use cases. EU TSPs, X9 Financial PKI, Adobe, ICAO, just to mention a few well known. I think large parts of industry has in the last couple of years realized that Web PKI isn't the most robust choice for non-browser use cases and use-case specific alternatives are showing up more and more. The PKI Consortium tried to establish a project for a "List of trust lists" a couple of years ago, but it didn't really get finished, but there is an archive here. https://github.com/pkic/ltl ________________________________ From: Nico Williams <[email protected]> Sent: Monday, March 23, 2026 11:09 AM To: Michael Richardson <[email protected]> Cc: Salz, Rich <[email protected]>; Tls <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]> Subject: [lamps] Re: TLS Client Certificates; a survey On Mon, Mar 23, 2026 at 02: 00: 35PM -0400, Michael Richardson wrote: > Salz, Rich <rsalz=40akamai. com@ dmarc. ietf. org> wrote: > > Since WebPKI CA’s will not be able to issue TLS-Client certificates, > > what are the customers On Mon, Mar 23, 2026 at 02:00:35PM -0400, Michael Richardson wrote: > Salz, Rich <[email protected]> wrote: > > Since WebPKI CA’s will not be able to issue TLS-Client certificates, > > what are the customers and CAs thinking of doing? > > You say this as if it's a new thing :-) well, it's recent. It happened around October 2025. > Is it the "change" that certificates obtained for code signing or email use > will have the tls-kp-clientAuth EKU ommitted? The change is that roots in the Chrome Root Program may not sign intermediates that sign any EE certificates having any EKUs other than id-kp-serverAuth. A CA can still have roots outside the CRP that do sign intermediates that do sign non-server EE certificates, but probably few will. > > Replies to be will be summarized to both lists. Please be careful if > > you use reply-all. > > 1. This assumes the RP are checking EKU. Yes, but they should. > 2. I think 94% of usage of mTLS is via private PKI for the client side. Probably true. The two applications I know to be affected are XMPP and SMTP. Nico -- _______________________________________________ Spasm mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
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