#20396: Tor Project crypto signatures will deceive with 32-bit key ids -----------------------------------------------------+----------------- Reporter: chadmiller | Owner: tpa Type: defect | Status: new Priority: Medium | Milestone: Component: Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team | Version: Severity: Critical | Keywords: Actual Points: | Parent ID: Points: | Reviewer: Sponsor: | -----------------------------------------------------+----------------- This page has key ids that are too short.
https://www.torproject.org/docs/signing-keys.html.en There are people impersonating GPG releasers in keyservers, and relying on ability to create keys that collide in lower 32 bits.. For instance, if someone takes the Nick key id 0x165733EA, that will fetch these keys from keyservers: gpg: key 21194EBB165733EA: public key "Nick Mathewson <ni...@alum.mit.edu>" imported gpg: key D50624EC165733EA: public key "Nick Mathewson <ni...@alum.mit.edu>" imported And someone fake a source download. Or Roger's 0x28988BF5 will get gpg: key EB5A896A28988BF5: public key "Roger Dingledine <a...@mit.edu>" imported gpg: key 9C01813428988BF5: public key "Roger Dingledine <a...@mit.edu>" imported or 0x19F78451 will get gpg: key 468FAE2919F78451: public key "Roger Dingledine <a...@mit.edu>" imported gpg: key C218525819F78451: public key "Roger Dingledine <a...@mit.edu>" imported The signatures page should never list any 32 bit values. Only have full fingerprints, or use the 64-bit long ids or longer. -- Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20396> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/> The Tor Project: anonymity online _______________________________________________ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs