#20459: ewma_cmp_cmux never considers policies different -------------------------------------------+------------------------------- Reporter: pastly | Owner: Type: defect | Status: closed Priority: High | Milestone: Tor: | 0.3.0.x-final Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Tor: | 0.2.6.2-alpha Severity: Normal | Resolution: fixed Keywords: 029-backport, review-group-11 | Actual Points: Parent ID: | Points: Reviewer: | Sponsor: -------------------------------------------+-------------------------------
Comment (by pastly): Ready for some graphs? This data was collected from two shadow simulations. Each has 500 relays and 7500 clients. The one line summary of the results (to me) is: the ewma fix does no harm by the metrics I gathered. qtime.shadow.results.pdf shows the amount of time a cell spends in the kernel outbound buffer after leaving Tor and becoming bytes. As you can see, no change. shadow.results.pdf shows a lot. - Time to download `x` bytes are for each different type of client. Clients with a smaller `x` behave a lot like web browsers. Clients with larger `x` are near continuous bulk downloads. Looks like no change. - A bunch of probably self-explanatory graphs all showing no change. - 60 second moving average read (pg 22) and write (pg 25). We give the network 30 simulation minutes for every relay/client to boot up and reach steady state, then measure for 10 simulation minutes. 'After' seems more stable than 'before', which would explain the better read and write performance for 'after'. So, IMO, the fix causes no harm and is beneficial. I can answer any questions about what graphs mean, what the simulations consist of, etc. I will attach the files right after hitting submit on this. Because I can't do it all at once ... ? -- Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20459#comment:14> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/> The Tor Project: anonymity online _______________________________________________ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs