#20638: Non-anonymous single-hop HS enabled tor doesn't detect already existing anonymous, HS at start-up --------------------------+------------------------------------ Reporter: ahf | Owner: Type: defect | Status: new Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.9.x-final Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Tor: 0.2.9.3-alpha Severity: Normal | Resolution: Keywords: tor-hs, sos | Actual Points: Parent ID: | Points: Reviewer: | Sponsor: --------------------------+------------------------------------ Changes (by arma):
* cc: asn, teor (added) Comment: Replying to [comment:1 ahf]: > It seems like at the initial start of `tor` that the: > > {{{ > if (!rend_service_list) { /* No global HS list. Nothing to see here. */ > return 0; > } > }}} > > path in in `rend_service_list_verify_single_onion_poison()` is taken, which will make the start up of tor proceed. Looks plausible! It looks like this code went in during commit b560f852, as part of ticket #17178. So I cc asn and teor since they're listed on that commit. :) rend_service_list_verify_single_onion_poison() is called from inside options_validate_single_onion() which is called from inside options_validate(), which is the function used to examine the new proposed 'options' set before acting on any of them. So it is not right for a function inside options_validate() to try to look at the rend_service_list. Better would be to either move that rend_service_list_verify_single_onion_poison() check to options_act() after it's called rend_config_services(), or to change rend_config_services() so it does the checks you want when validate_only is true, i.e. when it's being called from options_validate. I'd be weakly inclined towards the latter approach, because this is exactly the sort of thing that counts as "checking to see if you're going to like the new options, before committing to them". Specifically, see the rend_service_check_private_dir() calls in rend_config_services() -- maybe that's a good place for doing this further examination of the directory? -- Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20638#comment:3> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/> The Tor Project: anonymity online _______________________________________________ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs