#22890: Recent tor relays do use canonical connections ------------------------------+-------------------------------- Reporter: teor | Owner: Type: defect | Status: new Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: 0.3.2.x-final Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Severity: Normal | Keywords: tor-spec Actual Points: | Parent ID: Points: | Reviewer: Sponsor: | ------------------------------+-------------------------------- {{{ 5.3.1. Canonical connections
It is possible for an attacker to launch a man-in-the-middle attack against a connection by telling OR Alice to extend to OR Bob at some address X controlled by the attacker. The attacker cannot read the encrypted traffic, but the attacker is now in a position to count all bytes sent between Alice and Bob (assuming Alice was not already connected to Bob.) To prevent this, when an OR gets an extend request, it SHOULD use an existing OR connection if the ID matches, and ANY of the following conditions hold: - The IP matches the requested IP. - The OR knows that the IP of the connection it's using is canonical because it was listed in the NETINFO cell. - The OR knows that the IP of the connection it's using is canonical because it was listed in the server descriptor. [This is not implemented in Tor 0.2.0.23-rc.] }}} But it was implemented in some version since then. -- Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22890> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/> The Tor Project: anonymity online _______________________________________________ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs