#23123: Cannibalized HS circuit don't have their timestamp_dirty updated
     Reporter:  dgoulet       |      Owner:
         Type:  defect        |     Status:  new
     Priority:  Medium        |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
    Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |    Version:
     Severity:  Normal        |   Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-circuit
Actual Points:                |  Parent ID:
       Points:                |   Reviewer:
      Sponsor:                |
 Today, I encountered this behavior on a prop224 client when connecting to
 a service:

 Aug 06 15:21:06.000 [info] connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit():
 pending-join circ 3551616045 already here, with intro ack. Stalling.
 (stream 2 sec old)
 Aug 06 15:21:07.000 [info] circuit_expire_building(): Marking circ
 3551616045 (state 4:open, purpose 11) as timed-out HS circ;

 So my client was able to establish a rendezvous point but then just before
 being attached to a stream and ready to be used, it expires...

 That specific circuit has been cannibalized and in
 `circuit_launch_by_extend_info()`, a RP circuit calls
 `circuit_extend_to_new_exit()` to extend to it which does not update the
 `timestamp_dirty` and has this comment:

   // XXX: Should cannibalized circuits be dirty or not? Not easy to say..

 Sooooooo ultimately, down the rabbit hole, the `circuit_expire_building()`
 function checks the `timestamp_dirty` and has that comment:

           /* rend and intro circs become dirty each time they
            * make an introduction attempt. so timestamp_dirty
            * will reflect the time since the last attempt.

 ... but that is true only if `timestamp_dirty == 0` which is not true if
 the circuit was cannibalized.

 In `rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened()`, we have this:

   if (!circuit->base_.timestamp_dirty)
     circuit->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);

 Ok, seems the solution is just to set the `timestamp_dirty` every time
 when the RP/IP opens *or* we flag the circuit that it has been
 cannibalized and we can update the timestamp accordingly?

 Btw, this affects legacy system as well.

Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23123>
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