#4744: GFW probes based on Tor's SSL cipher list (?)
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Reporter: asn | Owner: nickm
Type: defect | Status: accepted
Priority: major | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.3.x-final
Component: Tor Bridge | Version:
Keywords: | Parent: #4185
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Comment(by nickm):
> and hope that it doesn't interfere with v2 signalling
and fwiw, it is almost impossible to interfere with v2 signalling. The way
to signal that a tor connection is v2/v3 is by including at least one
ciphersuite not in the list TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA, SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA.
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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4744#comment:5>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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