#17945: Stop Tor2Web connecting to (Rendezvous) Single Onion Services -------------------------------------------------+------------------------- Reporter: teor | Owner: (none) Type: enhancement | Status: | needs_information Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: | 0.3.3.x-final Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Severity: Normal | Resolution: Keywords: tor2web, tor-hs, 029-proposed, 029 | Actual Points: -teor-no, needs-design, needs-proposal-maybe, | single-onion | Parent ID: #24962 | Points: 5 Reviewer: | Sponsor: -------------------------------------------------+------------------------- Changes (by dgoulet):
* status: new => needs_information Comment: Ticket #24902 adds an option to refuse establish rdv from single hop client. I think we can extend this to relays that is if the previous and next hop in a rendezvous circuit are unauthenticated that is client connection, the circuit collapses. I'm just wondering here the bridge factor. I guess even if a SOS is configured to use a bridge (is it even possible?), it would require a client to single hop through a bridge for the RP to deny it. And maybe we don't care with such a crazy setup? -- Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17945#comment:36> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/> The Tor Project: anonymity online
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