#24902: Denial of Service mitigation subsystem -------------------------------------------------+------------------------- Reporter: dgoulet | Owner: dgoulet Type: enhancement | Status: closed Priority: Very High | Milestone: Tor: | 0.3.3.x-final Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Severity: Normal | Resolution: fixed Keywords: tor-dos, tor-relay, review- | Actual Points: group-30, 029-backport, 031-backport, | 032-backport, review-group-31, SponsorV | Parent ID: | Points: Reviewer: arma | Sponsor: -------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Comment (by hurus): Replying to [comment:81 cypherpunks]: > FWIW, Firefox can open more than 100 connections at once, so it is a relatively small threshold. Even if we count that Firefox will open less than 20 connections at once, limits are damaging everything. Number of end users decreases exponentially not because DoS stop but because regular users stop using Tor as they can not use it due to dumb limits. Decrease higher in countries with higher number of regular users and faster and more stable overall networks as those users tend to not use slow / unstable networks, this is just not acceptable in their life style / life environment. USA, China, Hong Kong, Mostly Europe have fast and stable in-country networks which shows in graph as massive users decrease. Countries with unstable and/or slow networks like Russia, Ukraine, Africa (all countries), Mexico, India / Pakistan, Iraq, Iran has less users decrease for the moment. But it will not last forever. Users will tend to stop using Tor at all. After users will stop using it, relay / bridge / guard owners will have no clue to run Tor nodes and will stop them as well. If it will continue that way, Tor will need a fork. -- Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24902#comment:82> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/> The Tor Project: anonymity online
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