#24977: Non-fatal assertion !(tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)node->hsdir_index->fetch, DIGEST256_LEN)) -------------------------------------------------+------------------------- Reporter: asn | Owner: asn Type: defect | Status: | needs_revision Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: | 0.3.4.x-final Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Tor: | 0.3.2.1-alpha Severity: Normal | Resolution: Keywords: tor-hs, prop224, | Actual Points: 034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180502 | Parent ID: | Points: 1 Reviewer: dgoulet | Sponsor: -------------------------------------------------+------------------------- Changes (by dgoulet):
* status: needs_review => needs_revision Comment: I think ideally we would like to do this if those two conditions are met: 1. Clock has jumped (at least the discrepancy from the code of 2+ sec) 2. If we transition from "not live" to "live" Recomputing the voting timings and HSDir index only makes sense if we had a consensus before that we didn't think it was live and after the clock jump, it became live. I'm not sure how easily we can achieve (2) here. Probably something like two flags where one says "previous consensus was not live" and second says "the whole recalculation of a new live consensus needs to happen"... Becomes a bit non-trivial to correctly set those with our code flow... The other option is to possibly keep the `valid_after` time of the consensus that was used for the HSDir index computation. If that time is 0 (unset) or smaller than the one we have in our *live* consensus and we detect the clock jump, we should readjust. The whole point of the above I think is to avoid only recomputing with the >= 100 seconds clock jump since edge cases appear if for instance we correct for only 10 seconds. -- Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24977#comment:15> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/> The Tor Project: anonymity online
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