#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features -------------------------------------------+--------------------------- Reporter: isabela | Owner: antonela Type: project | Status: assigned Priority: High | Milestone: Component: Applications/Tor Browser | Version: Severity: Normal | Resolution: Keywords: ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201810 | Actual Points: Parent ID: | Points: Reviewer: | Sponsor: Sponsor17 -------------------------------------------+---------------------------
Comment (by arthuredelstein): Replying to [comment:38 gk]: > Just to reply to this item: That's not proposed in comment:33. Here is what antonela wrote: > {{{ > Again: I think that the best way to improve the security slider is removing the slider component. As mentioned before, the slider is a UI artifact that doesn't add any value to this settings. Instead, it confuses users about their benefits on upgrade or downgrade. > > If we could simplify the security settings into a boolean option, we will follow the current Firefox approach on settings both in desktop and in mobile, and we will help users by making it easier to understand the trade-off: "Do I trust in this site?" > }}} > So, comment:33 proposes to reduce the slider from three options to two *in general* and bind all the security features to the transport. But you want to keep "safest", "safer", and "standard" but redo the "safer" option. So, these are different things. My interpretation of antonela's proposal in comment:33 is that there are three global levels. See [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/25658/25658%20-%206.4.png the image] under "General Settings - about:preferences#security". The three radio buttons correspond to "safest", "safer" and "standard". Then each site would have two possible states: protected or unprotected. -- Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/25658#comment:39> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/> The Tor Project: anonymity online
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