#28100: Tor shouldn't set Content-Type: application/octet-stream when 
compressing
results
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  Hello71                              |          Owner:  Hello71
     Type:  defect                               |         Status:
                                                 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:  Tor:
                                                 |  0.3.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  033-backport-maybe-not, 034          |  Actual Points:
  -backport-maybe-not, 035-backport-maybe-not    |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:
 Reviewer:  teor                                 |        Sponsor:
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------

Comment (by Hello71):

 Replying to [comment:7 teor]:
 > I also check if this branch changed browser behaviour. I fetched
 127.0.0.1/tor/server/authority[.z] with Safari:
 > * authority on 0.3.6.0-alpha-dev shows the text of the descriptor in the
 browser
 > * authority.z on 0.3.6.0-alpha-dev downloads it as a file
 > * authority on this branch shows the text of the descriptor in the
 browser
 > * authority.z on this branch shows the text of the descriptor in the
 browser
 >   * was transparent decompression the intended behaviour?

 It is unintended, but too difficult to avoid given the current code
 structure. As long as it doesn't cause any issues, I don't see any reason
 to change it. Once 0.2.9 is EOL, we should stop sending .z requests, and
 then at some point after that, we should stop accepting .z requests, so
 then it really won't matter.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/28100#comment:8>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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