#30164: Inconsistent Guard flag assignment --------------------------+---------------------------------- Reporter: Jaym | Owner: (none) Type: defect | Status: new Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: unspecified Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Tor: unspecified Severity: Normal | Resolution: Keywords: | Actual Points: Parent ID: | Points: Reviewer: | Sponsor: --------------------------+----------------------------------
Comment (by Jaym): Replying to [comment:3 arma]: > I believe that we are currently doing things as intended. That is, I think when we built the thing that is happening now, we meant to build it that way. > > But I agree with you that we should consider changes. See ticket #11327 for what I think is the same ticket as this one (and even mentions the same issue with the Fast flag too, as Aaron points out). > > The problem stems from the fact that we deployed the bwauth measurement concept, but then only some authorities started measuring, which creates an imbalance where some authorities are more important (and more influential) than others. Allow me to draw a parallel: I see the Tor ecosystem a bit like a representative but auditable democracy, where some trusted people vote upon inputs. This problem looks like if one of the elected individuals was casting vote over project/law that they did not even read. It sounds like the trusted person does not make an educated opinion about the question but comply with (potentially) malicious party to cast an uneducated vote. If such a thing was verifiable IRL, that would really be upsetting no? That's why I wonder if we should not make uneducated opinions to back off for this kind of feature. And as you said, it creates imbalance. Yet, we could come up with some rules like if "half of the trustees have educated opinions on security features, let's trust them". That looks reasonable and fairly easy to implement. -- Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30164#comment:6> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/> The Tor Project: anonymity online
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