#14389: little-t-tor: Provide support for better TBB UI of hidden service client authorization -------------------------------------------------+------------------------- Reporter: asn | Owner: tbb- | team Type: defect | Status: | needs_revision Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: | 0.4.2.x-final Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Severity: Normal | Resolution: Keywords: tor-hs, tbb-usability, ux-team, hs- | Actual Points: auth | Parent ID: #30000 | Points: 14-24 Reviewer: | Sponsor: | Sponsor27-must -------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Comment (by mcs): Replying to [comment:53 asn]: > Hey mcs and Kathy. I think the above seems plausible but I would need to lookup the code and SOCKS5 spec to see how this is done and whether we have enough space. As an alternative (to minimize added functionality) could we use the SOCKS username/password that is sent from TB to Tor in those control messages? We thought about that (and I feel bad that a lot of my suggestions potentially give you/dgoulet or other Network Team members more tasks to do). The problem is that we need to preserve the existing circuit isolation behavior while also adding some kind of request or tab ID. The current behavior (as I understand it) is that any unique combination of SOCKS5 UNAME and PASSWD will cause a different circuit to be used. And for performance reasons we don't want to use a different circuit for each browser tab, which means the ID would need to be handled in a special way. For example, if I have https://www.torproject.org/ open in one tab and https://support.torproject.org/ open in another tab, currently both use the same circuit. -- Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/14389#comment:54> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/> The Tor Project: anonymity online
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