#2681: brainstorm ways to let Tor clients use yesterday's consensus more safely
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Reporter: arma
| Owner:
Type: enhancement
| Status: new
Priority: normal
| Milestone: Tor: 0.2.4.x-final
Component: Tor
| Version:
Keywords: dirauth-dos-resistance proposal-needed MikePerry201210d tor-client
| Parent: #2664
Points:
| Actualpoints:
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Comment(by asn):
Just brainstorming here, but I wonder if some kind of metric on how
quickly the Tor network changes would help us decide if 3 days is a better
interval than 5 days.
By "how quickly the Tor network changes", I mean that if you take a
consensus X from 3 days ago and a consensus Y from today, what's the
percentage of routers in Y that are also in X (based on identity key)?
Such a metric could be a set of probability distributions that describe
how likely it is for the Tor network to change by a specific amount in X
days.
So, for example, the probability distributions would tell us stuff like
"Based on previous data, the Tor network has 40% chance to change by 20%,
in five days." or "The Tor network has 80% chance to change by less than
5%, in one day." or "The Tor network has 40% chance to change by 35%, in
two months".
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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2681#comment:14>
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