commit d1911650df97adf5c8c34de3f164adde3ec9086c
Author: Mike Perry <[email protected]>
Date: Thu Nov 6 17:16:21 2014 -0800
Another fix to the design doc.
---
projects/torbrowser/design/index.html.en | 26 +++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/projects/torbrowser/design/index.html.en
b/projects/torbrowser/design/index.html.en
index b4e285c..8624b4a 100644
--- a/projects/torbrowser/design/index.html.en
+++ b/projects/torbrowser/design/index.html.en
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
-<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN"
"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd";><html
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml";><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type"
content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" /><title>The Design and Implementation of
the Tor Browser [DRAFT]</title><meta name="generator" content="DocBook XSL
Stylesheets V1.78.1" /></head><body><div class="article"><div
class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a id="design"></a>The Design and
Implementation of the Tor Browser [DRAFT]</h2></div><div><div
class="author"><h3 class="author"><span class="firstname">Mike</span> <span
class="surname">Perry</span></h3><div class="affiliation"><div
class="address"><p><code class="email"><<a class="email"
href="mailto:mikeperry#torproject org">mikeperry#torprojectÂ
org</a>></code></p></div></div></div></div><div><div class="author"><h3
class="author"><span class="firstname">Erinn</span> <span
class="surname">Clark</span></h3><div class="a
ffiliation"><div class="address"><p><code class="email"><<a class="email"
href="mailto:erinn#torproject org">erinn#torprojectÂ
org</a>></code></p></div></div></div></div><div><div class="author"><h3
class="author"><span class="firstname">Steven</span> <span
class="surname">Murdoch</span></h3><div class="affiliation"><div
class="address"><p><code class="email"><<a class="email"
href="mailto:sjmurdoch#torproject org">sjmurdoch#torprojectÂ
org</a>></code></p></div></div></div></div><div><p class="pubdate">November
6th, 2014</p></div></div><hr /></div><div class="toc"><p><strong>Table of
Contents</strong></p><dl class="toc"><dt><span class="sect1"><a
href="#idp42746080">1. Introduction</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span
class="sect2"><a href="#components">1.1. Browser Component
Overview</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a
href="#DesignRequirements">2. Design Requirements and
Philosophy</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a
href="#security">2.1. Secu
rity Requirements</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a
href="#privacy">2.2. Privacy Requirements</a></span></dt><dt><span
class="sect2"><a href="#philosophy">2.3.
Philosophy</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a
href="#adversary">3. Adversary Model</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span
class="sect2"><a href="#adversary-goals">3.1. Adversary
Goals</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a
href="#adversary-positioning">3.2. Adversary Capabilities -
Positioning</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#attacks">3.3.
Adversary Capabilities - Attacks</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span
class="sect1"><a href="#Implementation">4.
Implementation</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a
href="#proxy-obedience">4.1. Proxy Obedience</a></span></dt><dt><span
class="sect2"><a href="#state-separation">4.2. State
Separation</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a
href="#disk-avoidance">4.3. Disk Avoidance</a></span></dt><dt><span
class="sect2"><a href="#app-data-isol
ation">4.4. Application Data Isolation</a></span></dt><dt><span
class="sect2"><a href="#identifier-linkability">4.5. Cross-Origin Identifier
Unlinkability</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a
href="#fingerprinting-linkability">4.6. Cross-Origin Fingerprinting
Unlinkability</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a
href="#new-identity">4.7. Long-Term Unlinkability via "New Identity"
button</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#other-security">4.8.
Other Security Measures</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a
href="#BuildSecurity">5. Build Security and Package
Integrity</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a
href="#idp45273472">5.1. Achieving Binary
Reproducibility</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a
href="#idp45308512">5.2. Package Signatures and
Verification</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#idp45312448">5.3.
Anonymous Verification</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="appendix"><a
href="#Transparency">A. Towards Tran
sparency in Navigation Tracking</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span
class="sect1"><a href="#deprecate">A.1. Deprecation
Wishlist</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#idp45344896">A.2.
Promising Standards</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><div class="sect1"><div
class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a
id="idp42746080"></a>1. Introduction</h2></div></div></div><p>
+<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN"
"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd";><html
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml";><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type"
content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" /><title>The Design and Implementation of
the Tor Browser [DRAFT]</title><meta name="generator" content="DocBook XSL
Stylesheets V1.78.1" /></head><body><div class="article"><div
class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a id="design"></a>The Design and
Implementation of the Tor Browser [DRAFT]</h2></div><div><div
class="author"><h3 class="author"><span class="firstname">Mike</span> <span
class="surname">Perry</span></h3><div class="affiliation"><div
class="address"><p><code class="email"><<a class="email"
href="mailto:mikeperry#torproject org">mikeperry#torprojectÂ
org</a>></code></p></div></div></div></div><div><div class="author"><h3
class="author"><span class="firstname">Erinn</span> <span
class="surname">Clark</span></h3><div class="a
ffiliation"><div class="address"><p><code class="email"><<a class="email"
href="mailto:erinn#torproject org">erinn#torprojectÂ
org</a>></code></p></div></div></div></div><div><div class="author"><h3
class="author"><span class="firstname">Steven</span> <span
class="surname">Murdoch</span></h3><div class="affiliation"><div
class="address"><p><code class="email"><<a class="email"
href="mailto:sjmurdoch#torproject org">sjmurdoch#torprojectÂ
org</a>></code></p></div></div></div></div><div><p class="pubdate">November
6th, 2014</p></div></div><hr /></div><div class="toc"><p><strong>Table of
Contents</strong></p><dl class="toc"><dt><span class="sect1"><a
href="#idp65114112">1. Introduction</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span
class="sect2"><a href="#components">1.1. Browser Component
Overview</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a
href="#DesignRequirements">2. Design Requirements and
Philosophy</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a
href="#security">2.1. Secu
rity Requirements</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a
href="#privacy">2.2. Privacy Requirements</a></span></dt><dt><span
class="sect2"><a href="#philosophy">2.3.
Philosophy</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a
href="#adversary">3. Adversary Model</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span
class="sect2"><a href="#adversary-goals">3.1. Adversary
Goals</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a
href="#adversary-positioning">3.2. Adversary Capabilities -
Positioning</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#attacks">3.3.
Adversary Capabilities - Attacks</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span
class="sect1"><a href="#Implementation">4.
Implementation</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a
href="#proxy-obedience">4.1. Proxy Obedience</a></span></dt><dt><span
class="sect2"><a href="#state-separation">4.2. State
Separation</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a
href="#disk-avoidance">4.3. Disk Avoidance</a></span></dt><dt><span
class="sect2"><a href="#app-data-isol
ation">4.4. Application Data Isolation</a></span></dt><dt><span
class="sect2"><a href="#identifier-linkability">4.5. Cross-Origin Identifier
Unlinkability</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a
href="#fingerprinting-linkability">4.6. Cross-Origin Fingerprinting
Unlinkability</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a
href="#new-identity">4.7. Long-Term Unlinkability via "New Identity"
button</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#other-security">4.8.
Other Security Measures</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a
href="#BuildSecurity">5. Build Security and Package
Integrity</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a
href="#idp67866160">5.1. Achieving Binary
Reproducibility</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a
href="#idp67901104">5.2. Package Signatures and
Verification</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#idp67905040">5.3.
Anonymous Verification</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="appendix"><a
href="#Transparency">A. Towards Tran
sparency in Navigation Tracking</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span
class="sect1"><a href="#deprecate">A.1. Deprecation
Wishlist</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#idp67937488">A.2.
Promising Standards</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><div class="sect1"><div
class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a
id="idp65114112"></a>1. Introduction</h2></div></div></div><p>
This document describes the <a class="link" href="#adversary" title="3.Â
Adversary Model">adversary model</a>,
<a class="link" href="#DesignRequirements" title="2. Design Requirements and
Philosophy">design requirements</a>, and <a class="link" href="#Implementation"
title="4. Implementation">implementation</a> of the Tor Browser. It is
current as of Tor Browser
@@ -654,13 +654,13 @@ system-wide extensions (through the use of
disabled, which prevents Flash cookies from leaking from a pre-existing Flash
directory.
- </p></div><div class="sect2"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3
class="title"><a id="disk-avoidance"></a>4.3. Disk
Avoidance</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3"><div
class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="idp45049760"></a>Design
Goal:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote
class="blockquote">
+ </p></div><div class="sect2"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3
class="title"><a id="disk-avoidance"></a>4.3. Disk
Avoidance</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3"><div
class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="idp67642512"></a>Design
Goal:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote
class="blockquote">
The User Agent MUST (at user option) prevent all disk records of browser
activity.
The user should be able to optionally enable URL history and other history
features if they so desire.
- </blockquote></div></div><div class="sect3"><div
class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a
id="idp45051120"></a>Implementation Status:</h4></div></div></div><div
class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote">
+ </blockquote></div></div><div class="sect3"><div
class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a
id="idp67643872"></a>Implementation Status:</h4></div></div></div><div
class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote">
We achieve this goal through several mechanisms. First, we set the Firefox
Private Browsing preference
@@ -734,7 +734,7 @@ the url bar origin for which browser state exists, possibly
with a
context-menu option to drill down into specific types of state or permissions.
An example of this simplification can be seen in Figure 1.
- </p><div class="figure"><a id="idp45073824"></a><p
class="title"><strong>Figure 1. Improving the Privacy UI</strong></p><div
class="figure-contents"><div class="mediaobject" align="center"><img
src="NewCookieManager.png" align="middle" alt="Improving the Privacy UI"
/></div><div class="caption"><p></p>
+ </p><div class="figure"><a id="idp67666576"></a><p
class="title"><strong>Figure 1. Improving the Privacy UI</strong></p><div
class="figure-contents"><div class="mediaobject" align="center"><img
src="NewCookieManager.png" align="middle" alt="Improving the Privacy UI"
/></div><div class="caption"><p></p>
This example UI is a mock-up of how isolating identifiers to the URL bar
origin can simplify the privacy UI for all data - not just cookies. Once
@@ -982,7 +982,7 @@ operating system type and even processor speed.
</p><div class="sect3"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4
class="title"><a id="fingerprinting-defenses"></a>Fingerprinting defenses in
the Tor Browser</h4></div></div></div><p>
The following defenses are listed roughly in order of most severe
-fingerprinting threat first. This ordering based on the above intuition that
+fingerprinting threat first. This ordering is based on the above intuition that
user configurable aspects of the computer are the most severe source of
fingerprintability, though we are in need of updated measurements to determine
this with certainty.
@@ -1377,11 +1377,11 @@ In order to avoid long-term linkability, we provide a
"New Identity" context
menu option in Torbutton. This context menu option is active if Torbutton can
read the environment variables $TOR_CONTROL_PASSWD and $TOR_CONTROL_PORT.
- </p><div class="sect3"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4
class="title"><a id="idp45220704"></a>Design Goal:</h4></div></div></div><div
class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote">
+ </p><div class="sect3"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4
class="title"><a id="idp67813456"></a>Design Goal:</h4></div></div></div><div
class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote">
All linkable identifiers and browser state MUST be cleared by this feature.
- </blockquote></div></div><div class="sect3"><div
class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a
id="idp45221952"></a>Implementation Status:</h4></div></div></div><div
class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
+ </blockquote></div></div><div class="sect3"><div
class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a
id="idp67814704"></a>Implementation Status:</h4></div></div></div><div
class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
First, Torbutton disables Javascript in all open tabs and windows by using
both the <a class="ulink"
href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/XPCOM_Interface_Reference/nsIDocShell#Attributes";
target="_top">browser.docShell.allowJavascript</a>
@@ -1461,7 +1461,7 @@ all non-WebM HTML5 codecs (<span
class="command"><strong>media.ogg.enabled</stro
Fingerprinting</a> is a statistical attack to attempt to recognize specific
encrypted website activity.
- </p><div class="sect3"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4
class="title"><a id="idp45250352"></a>Design Goal:</h4></div></div></div><div
class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
+ </p><div class="sect3"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4
class="title"><a id="idp67843072"></a>Design Goal:</h4></div></div></div><div
class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
We want to deploy a mechanism that reduces the accuracy of <a class="ulink"
href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feature_selection"; target="_top">useful
features</a> available
for classification. This mechanism would either impact the true and false
@@ -1483,7 +1483,7 @@ Congestion-Sensitive BUFLO</a>. It may be also possible
to <a class="ulink" href
defenses</a> such that they only use existing spare Guard bandwidth capacity
in the Tor
network, making them also effectively no-overhead.
- </p></blockquote></div></div><div class="sect3"><div
class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a
id="idp45257248"></a>Implementation Status:</h4></div></div></div><div
class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
+ </p></blockquote></div></div><div class="sect3"><div
class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a
id="idp67849968"></a>Implementation Status:</h4></div></div></div><div
class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
Currently, we patch Firefox to <a class="ulink"
href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/commitdiff/27ef32d509ed1c9eeb28f7affee0f9ba11773f72";
target="_top">randomize
pipeline order and depth</a>. Unfortunately, pipelining is very fragile.
Many sites do not support it, and even sites that advertise support for
@@ -1548,7 +1548,7 @@ contend with. For this reason, we have deployed a build
system
that allows anyone to use our source code to reproduce byte-for-byte identical
binary packages to the ones that we distribute.
- </p><div class="sect2"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a
id="idp45273472"></a>5.1. Achieving Binary
Reproducibility</h3></div></div></div><p>
+ </p><div class="sect2"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a
id="idp67866160"></a>5.1. Achieving Binary
Reproducibility</h3></div></div></div><p>
The GNU toolchain has been working on providing reproducible builds for some
time, however a large software project such as Firefox typically ends up
@@ -1665,7 +1665,7 @@ unitialized memory</a> that only appear in LXC mode, as
well as
<a class="ulink" href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12240";
target="_top">oddities related to
time-based dependency tracking</a> that only appear in LXC containers.
- </p></li></ol></div></div><div class="sect2"><div
class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="idp45308512"></a>5.2.Â
Package Signatures and Verification</h3></div></div></div><p>
+ </p></li></ol></div></div><div class="sect2"><div
class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="idp67901104"></a>5.2.Â
Package Signatures and Verification</h3></div></div></div><p>
The build process produces a single sha256sums.txt file that contains a sorted
list of the SHA-256 hashes of every package produced for that build version.
Each
@@ -1699,7 +1699,7 @@ and by their nature are based on non-public key material,
providing native
code-signed packages while still preserving ease of reproducibility
verification has not yet been achieved.
- </p></div><div class="sect2"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3
class="title"><a id="idp45312448"></a>5.3. Anonymous
Verification</h3></div></div></div><p>
+ </p></div><div class="sect2"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3
class="title"><a id="idp67905040"></a>5.3. Anonymous
Verification</h3></div></div></div><p>
Due to the fact that bit-identical packages can be produced by anyone, the
security of this build system extends beyond the security of the official
@@ -1815,7 +1815,7 @@ possible for us to <a class="ulink"
href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/t
ourselves</a>, as they are comparatively rare and can be handled with site
permissions.
- </p></li></ol></div></div><div class="sect1"><div
class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a
id="idp45344896"></a>A.2. Promising Standards</h2></div></div></div><div
class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><a
class="ulink" href="http://web-send.org"; target="_top">Web-Send
Introducer</a><p>
+ </p></li></ol></div></div><div class="sect1"><div
class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a
id="idp67937488"></a>A.2. Promising Standards</h2></div></div></div><div
class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><a
class="ulink" href="http://web-send.org"; target="_top">Web-Send
Introducer</a><p>
Web-Send is a browser-based link sharing and federated login widget that is
designed to operate without relying on third-party tracking or abusing other
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