On 2012-01-18, Nick Mathewson <[email protected]> wrote: > On Tue, Jan 17, 2012 at 1:28 PM, Robert Ransom <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> With that hack on top of the v3 protocol, any client able to detect >> that a bridge is not being MITMed can impersonate the bridge through >> the TLS handshake, until after the (honest, victim) client speaks the >> Tor protocol at the fake bridge. > > Seems mostly harmless; the only point of a shared secret there is to > keep scanning from working. Anybody who tries the above attack > already know that the bridge is there; all they learn is that the > client knew too, which they probably could have figured out as an > eavesdropper.
Censoring MITM attackers tend to MITM all SSL/TLS connections, regardless of their destination. No one would benefit from performing a targeted MITM attack on a bridge, even if we implemented bridge passwords in such a way that a MITM attacker can obtain the password needed to connect to (and use) a bridge. Robert Ransom _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
